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Ronald J. Daniels
Michael J. Trebilcock*

PRIVATE PROVISION
OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE NEXT PRIVATIZATION FRONTIERt
I

Introduction

Constrained by severe, ongoing fiscal pressures and sensitive to concerns over bureaucratic inefficiency, policy-makers in a number of
countries are re-evaluating both the goals and instruments of the
modern state. In doing so, some have endorsed the need for government 'reinvention,' a term that is admittedly susceptible of a broad
range of meanings, but which nonetheless contemplates a significant
shift away from reliance on governmental provision of goods and
services in favour of provision by the for-profit and third sectors.'
Although not uncontroversial, the claim is that, in comparison with
governmental supply systems, both for-profit and third sector modes of
delivery offer a superior means for organizing productive activity
because of the greater incentives that exist within these organizations
for lower-cost, innovative production. Although the claim has been
made in a number of different policy contexts, we focus on its salience
in the context of government's role in supplying traditional physical
infrastructure projects such as roads and highways, bridges, dams, water
and sewage systems, and airports.
Physical infrastructure offers a useful litmus test for evaluating the
sundry claims that have been made in favour of government reinvention. First, there is a growing level of concern in both the developed
and developing world with the adequacy of existing levels of investment
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in infra~tructure.~
In part, concern over infrastructural investment can
be traced to economic studies that have asserted a strong linkage between infrastructure investment and national productivity. Perhaps the
leading proponent of this view, David Aschauer, has argued that
declining levels of investment in infrastructure accounted for declining
productivity growth in the ~7 countries during the 1970s and 1980s."
Although the magnitude of the purported correlation between infrastructure investment and growth has been questioned in subsequent
research, that research has tended to confirm that such a relationship
does exist," and, further, that societal welfare gains could be realized

2 The World Bank has recently undertaken an extensive study of infrastructure investment in the developing world: World Bank report Infrastructure forDmeIopnmt (New
York: Oxford University Press 1994). The report notes that developing countries
currently invest $200 billion a year in new infrastructure, an amount kqual to 4% of
their national output and a fifth of their total investment, a level which is expected
to increase to 7% of total output by the year 2000. While private investment in
infrastructure now constitutes only 15% of the total investment, given fiscal
pressures, that level is expected to grow in the near future.
3 David Aschauer 'Is Public Expenditure Productive?' (1989) 24 J. of Moneta7y Econ.
177; 'Does Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital?' (1989) 24J of Moneta~yEcon.
171; and 'Public Investment and Productivity Growth in the Group of Seven' (1989)
13 Econ. Perspectives. Aschauer's results were based on regression analysis on a
standard Cobb Douglas aggregate production function which generated predictions
of the effect of infrastructure investment o n productivity. On the basis of Aschauer's
research, it is possible to attribute fully 100% of the productivity slowdown in the
United States over the last several decades to declining levels of infrastructure
investment. Indeed, Aschauer has claimed that returns to core infrastructure
expenditure may be as much as 20 times that of private capital. (David Aschauer
'Why Is Infrastructure Important?' in Alicia Munnell (ed.) 'Is the Public Capital
Stock Too Low?' Chicago Fed. Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, October
1987, No. 2.) On the basis of this work, Aaron projected that a $500 billion increase
in the 1988 stock of public capital would translate into a productivity gain of 14.0 to
14.8%. (Henry J. Aaron, Discussion of 'Why Is Infrastructure Important?' in Alicia
Munnell, supra, 51-63.) Similarly, Robert Reich has invoked Aschauer's work to
suggest that a one-time $10 billion increase in new infrastructure investment would
support a permanent $7 billion increase in US GNP. See Robert Reich 'The Real
Economy' (February 1991) 267 The Atlantic 35 at 46).
4 For instance, invoking cost function analysis, Catherine Morrison has found that
20% of productivity growth in the United States could be attributed to infrastructure
investment. (Catherine J. Morrison A Microeconomic Appoach to the Measurement of
Economic Performance: Productivity Growth, Capacity Utilization, and Related Perfnmance
Indicators (Springer-Verlag Press 1992); 'Macroeconomic Relationships between
Public Spending on Infrastructure and Private Sector Productivity in the U.S.' in J.
Mintz (ed.) Infrastructure and Competitiveness (Ontario: Queen's University 1995).
Specifically, Morrison has concluded that 'the cost-benefits from infrastructure
investment at the margin appear positive, significant, and often larger than the
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by reallocating public and private investment away from other expenditures towards infra~tructure.~
A second reason for focusing on physical infrastructure projects
relates to the challenges in designing workable institutional arrangements that permit public goals to be vindicated in a setting of enhanced private sector involvement. These issues are particularly acute in
physical infrastructure projects where an amalgam of efficiency and
distributional goals - public goods, natural monopolies, externalities,
coordination problems - have traditionally furnished support for public
intervention of some kind. To the extent that these rationales enjoy
some continued force, the question is whether and how enhanced
levels of private sector or third sector involvement can be reconciled
with a role for the state.
A final reason for focusing on physical infrastructure relates to the
distinct properties of these projects and the challenges posed for
devising optimal institutional arrangements. These properties include:
(1) the large, up-front investments required by physical infrastructure
projects (given asset lumpiness, investors often cannot make incremental investments, and typically these projects have high minimumefficient scales); (2) the longevity of infrastructure assets (implying that
the life span of the asset will often exceed the term of the project
contract, which creates contracting problems discussed below); (3) the
sunk investment in such assets (given the location and use-specific
nature of these assets, investors will not be able to recover the value of
their investment through the redeployment of assets to next-best uses);
(4) the anticipatory character of the investment (the final value of
physical infrastructure projects is hard to determine ex ante because

associated costs even when only manufacturing benefits are taken into account' (in
Mintz, supra). It should be noted that Aschauer's recent work, which is based o n an
expanded framework, yields results that are consistent with Morrison's.) Other
economists, relying on project-specific cost-benefit analyses, have also demonstrated
significant gains from targeted infrastructure investment. For instance, David Lewis
argues that fully audited benefit-cost studies of investments in new runways for
Minneapolis-St. Paul and Vancouver international airports yield reported rates of
return in excess of 100%. (David Lewis 'Infrastructure and Economic Growth' in
Mintz, supra.) He also cites studies respecting other infrastructure projects that
indicate significant benefits from public infrastructure investment: highway maintenance projects (30 to 40%), new highway construction in urban areas (10 to 20%),
and modernization and expansion of air traffic control systems (20 to 25%). For a
summary of these studies, see World Bank, supra note 2, 15.
5 See, for instance, Douglas Holtz-Eakin 'Public Sector Capital and the Productivity
Puzzle' National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 4122, July 1992.
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the services they provide are dependent upon the value of downstream
goods and services); and (5) the status of government as a party to
infrastructure projects with the private sector and the difficulties in
devising effective contractual commitments against ex post opportunism
by. government.
In this article, we canvass the scope for enhanced private sector
involvement in the provision of public infrastructure by focusing on
several different projects that have been recently initiated or completed
in Canada: airports (Terminal 3 and the aborted redevelopment of
Terminals 1 and 2 at Toronto's Pearson International Airport), toll
roads (Highway 407 north of Toronto), and bridges (the fixed link
between Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick). The structure of
these projects is based on an allegedly innovative set of organizational
arrangements: the so-called public/private sector partnership. The
stated purpose of these projects is to increase the level of private sector
participation in designing, building, and operating projects that service
public goals.
We develop two central themes in the article. First, while tangible
efficiency gains can be realized by remitting responsibility for infrastructure development to the private sector, we argue that these gains can
easily be offset by losses that derive from faulty design of both the
selection process and the contractual arrangements used for implementation. Second, and greatly complicating matters, are the contracting
problems posed by the status of government as a party to the public/
private partnership. Because of its inherent powers of legislative fiat,
governments can abrogate contractual undertakings without having to
compensate parties for the loss of their expectation profits. The
existence of this power places understandable limits on the willingness
of private sector developers to invest risk capital in these projects,
thereby depriving government of at least some of the benefits from
private sector involvement. In general, we conclude that insufficient
attention to the complexities of the institutional challenges raised by
highly integrated public/private sector infrastructure partnerships has
led to uncritical enthusiasm for them by many of their proponents. The
recent World Bank report Inji-astructurefor Deuelopmnt strikingly exemplifies this tendency: while emphasizing the magnitude of present and
prospective investments in infrastructure by developing countries and
the potential for a much enlarged role for the private sector in infrastructure development and operation, very little attention is paid to the
design of the institutional processes surrounding public/private sector
infrastructure partnerships or the complex contracting problems that
they present. However, the difference between success and failure of
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these projects in terms of the welfare gains over traditional modes of
infrastructure development resides in the institutional details that we
analyse herein.
II

Three recent Canadian case studies involving public/@vate
partnerships

A. INTRODUCTION

The public/private sector partnerships in the development and operation of infrastructure that are proliferating around the world vary
widely in both scale and nature. According to the World Bank, the
average size of such projects in low-income countries has been $440
million and that of projects in the planning stages has been even
higher, at $640 million. In middle-income countries average project size
is more than 25% smaller.' However, even in developed economies,
some projects are of very large scale, the best-known being the private
financing, construction, and operation of the Channel Tunnel between
England and France involving a capital investment of about $us11
billion.' By contrast, a number of public/private infrastructure partnerships relate to relatively small-scale activities, often at the local or
municipal level, such as water and sewage treatment facilities, often
entailing capital investments of a few million dollars. The sectors where
these partnerships have emerged also vary widely and include telecommunications, power generation, power distribution, gas distribution,
railroads, road infrastructure, ports, airport facilities, and water and
sewage treatment plants.g The nature of the arrangements involved
also varies widely. Some involve public ownership with private operation
through lease contracts, concessions, or management contracts, while
others involve full private ownership and private operation. Yet others
involve non-profit operation through local community organization^.'^
In this part, we briefly discuss the structure and salient features of
three recent Canadian case studies involving public/private partnerships in the development and operation of public infrastructure that
are the basis of the organizational analysis we develop in this article:

6 A detailed description of the case studies is developed in a draft manuscript on file
with the authors.
7 World Bank, supra note 2.
8 See Robert Tiong 'Comparative Study of BOT Projects' (1990) 6 J. of Managemat in
Engineering 107, 108.
9 World Bank, supra note 2, 64.
10 Ibid. 8 and 9.

Highway 407; The Prince Edward Island Fixed Link; and the redevelopment of Pearson International Airport in Toronto.

B. HIGHWAY 407
Highway 407 is a 69 km toll highway that is designed to alleviate traffic
congestion in the northern region of the Greater Toronto Area at a
cost of $929.8 million." Although the provincial ministry of transport
was initially committed to developing the project as a non-toll highway
through the traditional procurement model, government budget constraints would have dictated the project's completion over a twenty-year
period. By structuring the project as a public/private partnership, the
government was able to expedite the project's development to four-anda-half years." Further, by vesting ownership of the highway for a term
in the private sector, it can be presumed that government's direct responsibility for the imposition of the tolling charge (a revenue generation device used infrequently in Canada on public highways) would be
attenuated.
Responsibility for the selection of a project developer was vested in a
Crown corporation, the Ontario Transportation Capital Corporation
( o T c c ) . ' " ~ ~ OTCC used a three-stage selection process, involving an
initial request for expressions of interest and qualifications, a value
engineering exercise,14 and a closed-bid request for proposals. Three
consortia participated in the first round of the selection process, but
one consortium was disqualified early on, and only two bidders sub-

11 Employment benefits are estimated at 3,000 jobs in the first year and 20,000jobs
over the life of the construction project. jobsontario: Capital, news release, 8 April
and 1 1 May 1994.
12 Under the public/private partnership model, the project would take only four-and-ahalf years rather than the twenty years necessary under the traditional model.
Conversation with L. Brian Swartz, legal counsel, MTO, 1 June 1994.
13 The OTCC was established in 1993 for the purpose of financing and implementing
major public transit and highway construction projects, encouraging private sector
invesunent and participation, and focusing on user-pay financing methods. jobsontario news release, 10 February 1993. The actual nature of the relationship between
the OTCC and the provincial government is unclear, and the Crown corporation
seems to be an attempt by the Ontario government to shift infrastructure financing
off-budget, even though OTCC debt remains a liability of the provincial government. Although the OTCC is structured as a mechanism which dedicates toll
revenues to financing highway construction, it also seems to be able to finance
construction at least in part by borrowing against the general provincial credit
through government guarantees.
14 See discussion in note 48. infra.

mitted final bids. While it was initially anticipated that the project
would be privately financed, concerns by the remaining bidders with
the risks of low traffic volumes led to demands for government financial
guarantees. Ultimately, however, the government concluded that the
benefits of private sector financing did not outweigh the costs of such
guarantees, and the project was financed entirely through an o ~ c c
public debt issue. At the end of the selection process, the OTCC selected
Canadian Highways International Corporation to design and build the
project. As of June 1996, the operation and maintenance contracts had
not yet been executed.
C. THE PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND FIXED LINK

The Prince Edward Island Fixed Link is a federally sponsored project to
build a 13.5 km bridge across the Northumberland Strait, which would
constitute the first permanent crossing between PEI and the mainland.
The fixed link would seme as a substitute for the existing ferry service
between the mainland and PEI, which, in accordance with a constitutional obligation, was required to be subsidized by the federal government. The principal avowed benefit of the project was a significant
reduction in the time necessary to travel to and from the province,
resulting in enhanced local business competitiveness and increased
Island t o ~ r i s m . As
' ~ well, by contracting out the obligation to link the
mainland and PEI, the federal government sought to reduce the
financial level of its constitutional obligation.
The project was initiated in 1985, when the federal government
received several unsolicited private sector proposals for the develop
ment of a fixed link between PEI and the mainland. The project was
subject to extensive public review for social (particularly environmental)
benefits before and after the selection process was commenced.I6

15 The economic value of the reduced travel time is estimated to be $398.4 million
(1993$) (A Bmjit-Cost Analysis of the Northumberland Strait Crossing Project, prepared
by Gardner Pinfold Consulting Economists Limited, September 1993 at p. 4). The
fixed link is also expected to have additional indirect benefits on economic activity
in PEI and the Atlantic provinces, since construction of the bridge creates a large,
front-end-loaded job creation stimulus in the Atlantic economy, which is currently
suffering from a severe decline in the Maritime fishery - perhaps as many as 1,500
direct-hire jobs annually over the life of the project. (William G. Reinhardt 'PEI
Bridge Project Essentials' (November 1993) 68 PWinann'ng 23.)
16 The initial cost-benefit study conducted by PWC (Economic Feasibility Assessment
for the Northumberland Strait Crossing, Draft Final Report, July 1987, Fiander-Good
Associates Ltd.), which found a net benefit of close to $500 million (19875). has
been criticized on methodological grounds (Peter Townley 'The Weakest Link'

Indeed, so intense was public concern with the social impact of the
project that nearly six-and-a-half years transpired between the publication of the initial request for expressions of interest and the execution
of the contract between Strait Crossing Inc. (sc1)17 and the federal
government.I8
As with Highway 407, the government used a multi-stage selection
process, in this case involving an initial request for expressions of
interest and qualifications, a request for proposals, and a request for
more complete proposals (including a financial plan). Initially, twelve
different consortia expressed interest in the project. However, by the
final stage of the selection process, only three bidders remained. The
winning bidder, SCI, was selected on the basis that, inter alia, it
required the lowest level of federal financial assistance to develop the
project: $40.6 million annually for a term of 35 years.'YThe subsidy
conferred by the federal government on the project operators graphically underscores the persistence of government risk sharing in these
pr~jects.'~Having selected scr, sixteen months of negotiations were
required before the government and the consortium were able to

17

18

19

20

(July/August 1992) 13(6) Policy Options 15; and A Review of the Bmfit-Cost Analysis of
the Northumberland Strait Crossing Project, prepared by Gardner Pinfold Consulting
Economists Limited, September 1992). However, a subsequent cost-benefit study
conducted by one of the critics found a net benefit of $263.6 million (19935)
(Gardner Pinfold, supra note 15; note that this 1993 study was commissioned by
Public Works Canada). The main difficulties in the cost-benefit studies were the
valuation of travel savings, the treatment of corporate taxes, and the determining of
the social opportunity cost of labour.
SCI is a joint venture owned by four firms: Strait Crossing Inc. of Calgary (15%);
Northern Construction Co. (35%); GTMI (Canada) Inc. of Montreal (30%); and
Ballast Nedam (20%). Consultation with Strait Crossing office, Charlottetown, 26
August 1994.
Such searching social review is a necessary complement to whatever private sector
certification occurs through the financing process, as the latter is predicated on
private, not social, costs and benefits.
The federal government's obligation to supply $41.9 million a year in indexed
funding to the project developers was then used to support a debt issue of $661
million by the developers in exchange for rights to the subsidy. After the 35-year
period, the government's subsidy would end, and the project developers would be
required to recover ongoing maintenance costs entirely from toll revenues.
In addition, the federal government assumed a number of different exogenous risks
related to the project, in some cases agreeing to compensate SCI for costs of delay
related to war, earthquakes, nuclear events, government regulation specifically
affecting the project, and environmental injunctions.

conclude a ~ontract.~'
To safeguard XI'S franchise, the contract
between the federal government and the developer limited the government's ability to compete with the project by providing ferry service or
by constructing an additional bridge or tunnel within 25 km of the
fixed link or by any means that would significantly reduce traffic
volumes. However, in the light of the monopoly power conferred on
the operator by this restriction, the contract imposed limits on permissible increases in bridge tolls by the operator to 75% of CPI.
D. T H E REDEVELOPMENT OF PEARSON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

The Pearson International Airport project was a staged public/private
project designed to redevelop Toronto's congested international airport
by securing private sector involvement in the design, construction, and
operation of two new terminal facilities. The first, Terminal 3 (T3),
involved the construction of a new terminal building, parking garage,
and adjacent hotel and office complex, while the second, the redevelopment of Terminals 1 and 2 (TlT2), involved the replacement of the
airport's two existing (and somewhat dilapidated) terminals with a
single new terminal which would have had 55 gates in total by the year
2000." Several reasons were advanced for enlisting private sector
involvement in the project, including higher levels of revenue likely to
be generated for the federal government by the project (as opposed to
a scenario of continued federal government ownership and operation),
the need to ensure the timely introduction of new capacity, and the
superior organizational efficiency of the private sector.23The T3 project was announced in 1986 and was based upon a two-stage selection
process: an initial request for expressions of interest and qualifications,
and then a second-stage request for proposals. As in other projects, the
criteria used to determine success in the first-round tournament for
design ideas were fairly broadly defined: Transport Canada merely
identified that the objectives of the project were to: provide a 'worldclass' terminal in the shortest period of time; provide a financial return

21 The primary factors in this delay were the two environmental challenges pursued in
the Federal Court against the minister of public works.
22 According to a 1987 Transport Canada study, Pearson International Airport has a $4
billion direct economic impact o n the economy of Ontario and is directly and indirectly responsible for over 56,000jobs. Referred to in the Nixon Report, infra.
23 According to Transport Canada, the purposes of the Terminal 3 development were
to (1) provide a world-class air terminal facility; (2) reduce government investment
in airport facilities; (3) increase private sector participation; and (4) provide a
financial return to the federal government. See LBPIA-General Distribution, p. 6.
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to the Crown; and maintain acceptable levels of safety and security to
air travellers in Canada. Requests by the bidders for information with
respect to the actual weighting of each of these factors by the project
evaluation team were refused. Eight bids were submitted in the design
tournament, and, of those, five consortia were qualified to proceed to
the second stage. Of these, only four consortia submitted final proposals, and, at the end of June 1987, the federal government awarded the
project to Airport Development Corporation (ADC).
Within five months,
the government was able to execute a contract with ADC for the project
based on a 40-year lease (with a 20-year period of renewal) with required
annual lease payments that would vary directly with gross revenues and
with the time since project completion. Although the project was
expected to cost $350 million, an expansion in capacity to accommodate an expected increase in traffic load of the terminal's principal
tenant, Canadian Airlines, increased costs to $550 million. The project
was completed within 32 months of commencement.
Whereas the rapid completion of the T3 project was viewed as a
model for public/private partnerships, the TIT2 redevelopment project
was much less so. Almost from the outset, the project was embroiled in
controversy. The first reason for controversy was based on the federal
government's decision, apparently motivated by revenue goals, to
depart from its stated policy preference for vesting responsibility for the
development of federal airports in local airport authorities - not-forprofit organizations which would be governed by, and accountable to,
local interest groups.24 The second principal reason for controversy
was the decision to proceed with the project by way of a single-stage
selection process rather than the multi-stage selection process that had
been used in other projects. Concerns over the process were compounded by the decision to allow only 90 days (later extended to 125
days) for the submission of formal proposals. However, given the long
(one-and-a-half-year) period of delay between the time when the
government announced its intention to seek private sector participation
in the T1T2 project and the call for proposals, the accelerated time

24 The decision to proceed with a private developer was motivated by the desire to
ensure the rapid development of the project (specifically with a view to increasing
local construction employment) and by infighting among local politicians over the
composition of the local airport authority designated for the Greater Toronto Area.
It was also alleged by some that patronage considerations affected the decision (see,
for instance, Nixon Report at 9). The federal government's preference for the local
airport authority concept was set out in Guiding Principles (Ottawa: Ministry of
Transport 1987) and elaborated upon in Supplementaq Principles for the Creation and
Operation of Local AilgM Authurities (Ottawa: Ministry of Transport 1989).

period may not have visited serious hardship on interested bidders. In
any event, three bids for the project were ultimately submitted, of
which two were deemed to be within the stipulated terms of reference.
Of these two, the government awarded the contract to Paxport Inc.
However, soon after the contract was awarded, Paxport was required to
merge with the losing bidder, Air Terminal Development Group,'"
because the former lacked the financial resources to develop the
project on its own.26
In August 1993 (eight months after the contract was awarded), a
general agreement for the project was concluded between the merged
consortium, Pearson Development Corporation ( P D C ) , and the federal
government. As in the case of Terminal 3, the arrangement was structured as a long-term lease (57 years) involving sliding-scale lease payments. Similar to the PEI Fixed Link, the contract with the developer
limited the government's ability to undertake actions which would
directly debase the operator's franchise, by, for instance, permitting an
airport to be built within 25 kilometres of the airport if it would reduce
passenger volume by more than 1.5 million passengers a year.'7 However, the TIT2 contract did stipulate limits on the prices that retail
concessionaires and parking lot operators could charge customers2s
and provided constraints on the strategic use by occupant airlines of
the airport gates to forestall entry by competitors.29 Further, as in
other projects we surveyed, in both the T3 and TIT2 airport develop
ments, the federal government agreed to a scaled rental formula that
resulted in a de facto sharing of the risks of low gross revenues with the
These were supplemented in the case of T3 by
developer/operat~r.~
a $70 million loan guarantee contingent on low passenger volume^.^'

25 ATDC was substantially the same consortium that had developed and was operating
Terminal 3.
26 Apparently, the federal government failed to consider financing capability when
reviewing prospective developers for the project.
27 However, once a stipulated threshold level of passenger volume was exceeded, the
constraint would n o longer apply.
28 Prices charged could not exceed 115% of the prices charged for comparable goods
and services in downtown Toronto.
29 Through 'use them or lose them' requirements.
30 It also consented to the airport developer utilizing a cost-based rental formula in
respect of the rental obligations of the retail concessionaires and airlines, which,
given the monopoly properties of the airport, can best be understood as an
enforced sharing of developer/operator risks with these parties.
31 While such a guarantee was not provided for in the T1T2 project, the government
did make an allowance for a maximum $33 million deferral of rental payments
incurred by the developer in the first three years of the project.
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Given the intense concern expressed by the press and others during
the 1993 fall federal election campaign with the terminal development,
Jean Chrktien's newly elected Liberal government requested a review
and report of the transaction from Robert Nixon, a prominent Liberal
party member and former provincial cabinet minister. His report,
completed in a mere 30 days, found that the contract with the consortium was severely flawed and should be cancelled, subject only to
minimal levels of compensation (for expenditures made to the date of
cancellation) being provided to consortium members." On 3 December 1993 the government cancelled the contract. However, issues of
compensation for PDC could not be resolved through negotiation, and
in April 1994 the government introduced legislation which would
permit it to impose a settlement of approximately $30 million on the
developers, but without the attendant procedural safeguards that
normally accompany the public power of confiscati~n.~~
The legislation has not yet been adopted by Parliament because of the determined

32 Nixon concluded that t h e project 'fell far short o f maximizing t h e public interest'
(at 9 ) . T h e recommendation that t h e deal b e abrogated was based o n perceived
infirmities i n b o t h t h e selection process and t h e contracts designed t o implement
t h e transaction. In terms o f t h e former, N i x o n focused o n t h e fact that t h e
privatization of t h e terminals contradicted stated government policy i n favour o f
local airport authorities; o n t h e single-stage, abbreviated selection process that led t o
a n enormous advantage t o ATDC (which had gained previous experience through
its successful participation i n t h e Terminal 3 contract); and o n t h e lack of a
financial prequalification requirement. N i x o n further alleged that t h e selection
process was sullied by patronage - three individuals i n t h e consortium were closely
identified with t h e Progressive Conservative party. T h e report also alleged a n u m b e r
o f substantive shortcomings i n t h e contracts.-Among t h e most serious was t h e length
o f t h e lease t e r m , which Nixon characterized as being 'difficult t o fathom' given
that 'with a n asset as moved b y technological change as a n airport, t h e length of this
obligation does n o t serve t h e public interest' ( a t 1 1 ) . In Nixon's view, t h e rental
formula was flawed because future government revenues f r o m t h e project
would b e
.
highly d e p e n d e n t o n aggressive pricing conducted without appropriate governmental control and at t h e risk o f making t h e airport uncompetitive with other
airports i n Canada and t h e United States ( a t 1 1 ) . It is, o f course, n o t selfevident
why t h e private developer would adopt operational policies that would m a k e t h e
project uncompetitive. Finally, Nixon expressed concern with t h e broadly phrased
performance obligations that b o u n d PDC, noting that it would b e difficult for t h e
Government o f Canada t o determine w h e n such obligations are breached. Because
t h e government's remedies for breach are so Draconian (cancellation or seizure and
operation), Nixon speculated that t h e government would b e unlikely t o exercise
such powers (at 1 2 ) .
3 3 Bill G 2 2 : An Act respecting certain agreements concerning t h e redevelopment and
operation of Terminals 1 and 2 at Lester B. Pearson International Airport (First
Session, Thirty-Fifth Parliament, 42-3 Elizabeth 11, 1994).
-

resistance of the Progressive
Conservative-controlled Senate to the
measure, fuelled by growing public apprehension regarding the bill and
by a judicial determination that the government had breached its
contractual obligation^.'^ The matter was remitted to a special Senate
committee on the Pearson Airport agreements for a public inquiry,
which divided along partisan lines in its 1995 report.
E. SUMMARY: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Following the standard pattern for large-scale infrastructure projects,
each of the projects we examined contained several common characteristics. First, each of the projects entailed large, up-front, sunk investments by bidders that were not compensated for by direct ex ante
government subsidies (ranging from approximately $6 million incurred
by the bidders who submitted proposals for the Highway 407 project to
$30 million incurred by SCI in developing its bridge proposap5).
Second, each of the projects implicated a range of public policy
concerns which could not be sidestepped by the decision to develop
the project through a public/private partnership. As illustrated by the
PEI Fixed Link, concern over the effectiveness and transparency of
levers that the state would be able to wield during and after the
construction of the project led to heightened public apprehension
around the project's merits and resulted in considerable delay. Indeed,
review of the contracts concluded between sponsoring governments (or
their agents) and the project developers disclosed considerable attention to these public policy concerns. In some cases, specific contractual
limitations were placed on the operator's ability to charge monopoly
prices for access to the goods and services under consideration. In the
T3 airport project the contract went even further, explicitly incorporating by reference federal, provincial, and municipal laws, and making
non-compliance with these laws an event of default under the contract.
Of course, given developer concerns over sunk, up-front investments in

34 This finding was in the context of a claim made by the consortium against the
federal government for unspecified damages but apparently alleging losses,
including forgone profits, in excess of $200 million: TIT2 Limited Paflnership v.
Canada [I9951 OJ No. 137, Court File No. 94-CQ53762 (Ontario Court of Justice
General Division, per Borins J) (plaintiffs have provided evidence which satisfies me
that the defendant committed a breach of the airport contracts on 3 December
1993, at paragraph 4). See also 'Developers Sue Over Loss of Airport Deal' Globe and
Mail, 17 September 1994.
35 Apparently the bidding costs were fifteen times higher than originally projected by
SCI. William G. Reinhardt 'The High Cost of Building Bridges' (November 1993) 68
PWinann'ng 18, 26.
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specific assets, the desire to incorporate sensitivity to broadly defined
public policy concerns often was in direct tension with the need to
provide credible assurances to the developer/operator (as an inducement to investment) that the franchise value of the undertaking would
not be debased ex post by direct governmental action. Third, with the
exception of the T3 airport project, the process used to award the
infrastructure franchise involved multiple stages, typically an initial
tournament for design ideas followed by a final competition for the
construction and operation contract for those bidders successful in the
first stage.36One notable feature of the selection process used in each
of these cases was the small number of bidders who actually progressed
A fourth common characteristic
to the final stage of the t~urnament.~'
of these projects was the lengthy period of time (ranging from several
months in the case of T3 to well over a year in the case of the PEI Fixed
Link) between the time of the formal award of the franchise and the
actual consummation of the written contract necessary to implement
the project, which probably attenuated the impact of the competitive
bidding process on the winning bidder's post-selection performance
incentives. Fifth, despite the characterization of these projects as being
based on the efficiency benefits associated with private sector finance
and risk bearing, virtually all of these projects revealed some significant
role for the government in this area, ranging from government-backed
public financing of the entire project, in the case of Highway 407; to
provision of a long-term governmental subsidy that was used to fund
the lion's share of the project costs, in the case of the PEI Fixed Link;
to revenue-based ground lease payments that rendered government a
quasi-residual claimant, in the case of the airport terminals. Sixth, as is
true of long-term contractual relationships generally, the contracts
executed between sponsoring governments and franchise operators
disclosed considerable reliance on elaborately designed adjustment
formulas (in respect of pricing and maintenance obligations) and
governance structures to deal with problems of contractual incomplete-

36 Information respecting the structure of these projects was derived principally from
an extensive set of interviews conducted over the summer of 1994 with public and
private sector experts involved in the projects and from inspection of the various
contracts used to implement the projects.
37 In Highway 407, three bidders expressed initial interest, but only two progressed to
the final stage of the bidding process; in the PEI F i e d Link, twelve bidders
expressed initial interest, but only five progressed to the final stage; in the T3
airport project, eight bidders started out, but only four progressed to the final stage;
while in the T1T2 project, only three bidders submitted proposals.

ness." Significantly, when governance mechanisms were utilized, the
mechanisms were based on standard arbitration models used in the
private sector. To the extent that it has been argued by Goldberg and
others that the adjustment mechanisms used by public utility commissions to administer regulatory contracts are functionally equivalent to
the contractual provisions embedded in long-term public franchise contracts, this claim is thus only partially correct in the context of the
contracts we e~amined.~'
In contrast to the public utility model, public
franchise contracts reveal only limited opportunity for meaningful levels
of transparency or public participation, thereby raising fundamental
accountability concerns.
111

Analysis of the organizational structure of public/pi.vate
infimtructure partnerships

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to appreciate the distinctive features of many of the public/
private partnerships that have emerged in the infrastructure setting,
particularly with respect to larger projects, it is important not to draw
too sharp a dichotomy between the respective roles of the public and
private sectors. With many publicly owned and operated infrastructure
facilities, such as airport terminals, many of the functions have traditionally been contracted out, for example, catering, security services,
airplane refuelling, baggage handling, retail concessions, and janitorial
services. Moreover, even with respect to the initial construction of these
facilities, governments rarely, if ever, build these facilities themselves
through public sector employees, but rather tender out the construction through a competitive bidding process against a detailed set of
tender specifications that the government has developed either internally or through consulting arrangements with external design specialists,

38 For instance, concerns over asset degradation through chiselling on required
maintenance - one of the principal contractual difficulties involving assets having an
expected life that exceeds the term of the franchise contract - were dealt with
through a number of different mechanisms, including: general exhortatory duties
on the developer/operator to maintain assets in an appropriate condition, stipulated
expenditures o n asset maintenance (expressed as a percentage of annual gross
revenues), annual contributions to an asset reserve fund, periodic inspections by
third-party monitors, and provision for resolution of disputes over the breadth of
this obligation through binding arbitration.
39 Victor Goldberg 'Regulation and Administered Contracts' (1976) BeUJ. ofEcon. 426.
See also George Priest 'The Origins of Utility Regulation and the 'Theories of
Regulation" Debate' (1993) 36 J.L.E 289.
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with the winning bidder in turn subcontracting out various aspects of
the construction to specialized third parties, often through a competitive bidding process of its own.
The most distinctive feature of many of the larger public/private
sector infrastructure partnerships that are now emerging is the integration within a single private sector firm or consortium of all (or most of)
the functions of financing, designing, building, operating, and maintaining the facility in question (subject again to further subcontracting
out). The bundling of these functions reflects a form of vertical integration on the part of the private sector provider of these services. Because
the functions involved are often highly specialized and entail deployment of quite different bodies of complementary expertise and resources, private sector providers are, however, typically not vertically
integrated firms in a conventional sense but consortia ('virtual corporations') that are formed to develop and operate a particular infrastructure facility. This arrangement reflects the often relatively sui generis
requirements of that facility, usually involving as participants engineering and project management firms, construction firms, financial underwriters, and specialized operating firms. While the consortia typically
incorporate their joint venture as a corporation for the project in
question, they have a higher degree of malleability or transitoriness
relative to the conventional firm. The partners often maintain substantially independent activities, although there are clear reputation and
learning curve advantages for consortia in preserving some stability of
membership where there are opportunities for bidding on similar
infrastructure projects in what is rapidly becoming a global market for
these services, and in these cases consortia may evolve permanent
corporate structure^.^^
In this section of the article, we explore the potential efficiency gains
to be made, at least in principle, from extensive integration, or bundling of financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance
functions in a single provider. At the same time we examine a range of
institutional problems relating to the design of the bidding process, the
contract negotiation process, and contract monitoring and enforcement
processes which these new arrangements give rise to and which may
substantially attenuate potential efficiency gains from this particular
form of privatization of public sector activities. The problems of

40 In the T3 airport project, the principal construction firm, Huang and Danczkay,
sold its interests once the terminal was completed, illustrating the fluid nature of
these relationships.

creating and preserving a genuinely competitive bidding and rebidding
process, the long-term nature of the contracts entailed and hence the
difficulties of writing complete contingent claims contracts, the largescale sunk costs typically involved, and the financial sensitivity of these
projects to changes in the governmental policy environment all raise
special challenges. We also briefly consider distributional and political
considerations that may influence a government's decision to privatize
infrastructure services and the form that the privatization arrangements
may take. We then analyse the particular problems of credible commitments raised by the central fact that the government is a party to these
contractual arrangements.
B. POTENTIAL EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM VERTICALLY INTEGRATED PRIVATE

SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION

1. The traditional procurement model
In assessing the potential efficiency gains that may be realized from
vertically integrated private sector providers (consortia) of infrastructure services, it is important to be clear as to the comparative reference
point against which these arrangements are being evaluated. For major
road, bridge, or airport facilities of the kind on which this article
focuses, governments traditionally have themselves identified the need
for the project, often reflecting pressures for or against particular
projects by politically salient constituencies, and sometimes tested more
objectively through benefit-cost analysis. Whether the project proceeds
or not has been, to an important extent, contingent on the relevant
level of government's fiscal capacity at the time (in many countries in
recent years increasingly constrained by severe budget deficits) and on
the revenuegenerating capacity of the project, which in turn in part
depends on where it is situated on the public-goods/privategoods
continuum in terms of meeting the criteria of rivalry and excludability
that distinguish private goods from public goods, and in part on
distributional and political considerations that may dictate that the
services in question should be provided free or at subsidized rates to
some or all user classes, even where efficient user charges
- for the
services in question could be devised. Assuming that a decision is made
to proceed with the project, typically government will draw up a set of
comprehensive technical specifications for the initial construction of
the facility, in part relying on already developed technical standards or
manual specifications for the class of facility in question, or, to the
extent the facility presents novel features, through project-specific
specifications developed by internal technical personnel or outside
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specialized consultants such as architectural or engineering firms, or
some combination thereof. Once these detailed specifications have
been fully developed, government departments or agencies would then
typically advertise for tenders for the construction of the facility in a
competitive bidding process. In order to qualify as bidders, firms may
be required to demonstrate relevant credentials such as financial and
technical capacity, and past experience and performance records on
similar projects. The contract with the winning bidder will specify
completion date, security and penalties for non-completion or other
defaults in performance, and provide for a schedule of payments to the
construction firm reflecting satisfactory completion of sequential stages
of the project as determined either by staff of the government department or agency concerned or by some agreed third-party certification
agent. Broadly speaking, contracts could be cost-plus, fixed-price, or
With respect to cost-plus contracts, these provide
incentive ~ontracts.~'
few incentives for the private sector contractor to minimize construction costs and correspondingly entail greater risk for the public sector,
which will attempt to minimize this risk by intensive but costly monitoring of the contractor's costs. Under a fixed-price contract, the contractor's costs will be of no direct concern to the government, so that less
intensive monitoring will be required, although monitoring will still be
relevant to non-price dimensions of performance. If construction costs
are likely to be affected by technological uncertainties, climatic factors,
variable input prices, or labour shortages or disputes, these risks, which
the contractor will bear, will presumably be reflected in a risk premium
embodied in the fixed price negotiated in the contract. Under incentive contracts, these risks may be shared in various ways. Any such risk
sharing will involve risk-incentive trade-offs. Incentives on the contractor to minimize costs may be reduced, to the extent that he can control
these factors, although the risk premium charged the government for
risks over which he has little or no control is likely to be smaller. With
respect to government-determined risks or entirely exogenous risks, the
government may be the more efficient risk bearer, given its greater
capacity to spread the risk. After satisfactory completion of the project,
the government may choose to operate the facility entirely itself
through government employees; or, depending on the nature of the
facility, it may contract out, for limited periods of time, under a competitive bidding process, the performance of various functions.

41 See R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan Incentives in Government Contracting
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1988).
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2. The vertically integrated private sector model
a) Project identification. In comparison with this traditional model of the
infrastructure development and operation process, the fully vertically
integrated private provision model that is the focus of this article differs
in important respects. First, the government may choose to invite
private sector firms to identify potential infrastructure projects. For
example, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
recently issued an open-ended public invitation for private sector firms
to propose toll-road projects in California, which the government
agency then e~aluated.~'
Complete government detachment from the
question of which projects should proceed is often impossible because
of right-of-way and eminent domain issues, network externalities, other
external impacts, and monopoly pricing concerns. The private sector,
in identifying potential infrastructure projects, will of course be driven
by a different set of considerations from the public sector in engaging
in the same exercise. As noted above, the public sector is likely to
respond to a mix of political pressures and may in addition undertake
a benefit-cost analysis that weighs all relevant social costs and benefits
associated with the project. Private sector proposals will be influenced
only by the expected private rate of return on the project, which will
disregard political pressures one way or the other, and are likely to also
disregard external costs and benefits of the project that would be
captured in a comprehensive social benefit-cost analysis. However, with
a totally open-ended public sector invitation to the private sector to
propose new infrastructure projects, the evaluation process that the
public sector will subsequently have to undertake of these proposals will
presumably implicate both political considerations and social costs and
benefits, so that proposers are likely to attempt to anticipate, and to
some extent accommodate, these considerations in their proposals,
consistently with realizing an adequate private rate of return on the
project. Unless most of the evaluation criteria to be employed by the
government are rendered at least partly explicit and transparent, or
other indications are provided in the invitation that to some extent
define the range of projects in which the government may be inte-

42 See Jose Gomez-Ibanez and John Meyer Going Aiuate: The International Experience with
Transpmt Priuatization (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Ron Hirshhorn
'The Ownership and Organization of Transportation Infrastructure: Roads and
Airports' Background Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on National
Passenger Transportation: Directions (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada 1992) 18.
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rested, proposers are unlikely to invest significant resources, at least in
the absence of subsidies, in developing proposals that may prove to be
of no interest to the government. In any event, these proposals are
likely to be framed at a largely conceptual level, leaving detailed design
for the post-project identification stage.
Under the fully vertically integrated private provider model, once a
project has been identified, at least at the conceptual level, either by
the government itself or by the government in response to private
sector proposals, in theory the government would call for integrated
bids on the design, construction, operation, and maintenance aspects of
the project. Each of these functions needs to be analysed both separately and in relation to the other functions in the bundle.

b) Design. With respect to the design function, the argument by
proponents of the privatization of infrastructure provision is that unlike
the traditional method of contracting out engaged in by government in
the infrastructure context, where comprehensive specifications of
project characteristics are provided to private sector parties, the government stands to realize substantial efficiency gains from contracting out
the design function and, in effect, stimulating competition for ideas.
Implicit in this view is the notion that governments should shift their
focus from specifying inputs to specifying some desired outcome,
leaving private sector providers with the opportunity of formulating
means of realizing that outcome in the most cost-efficient way possible.
Under the traditional contracting-out regime, government agencies
would typically rely on standardized specifications or bureaucrats would
develop design specifications for sui generis projects, but with few
incentives to maximize service innovations or minimize costs, and
disabled by major information asymmetries as to what may or may not
be technologically feasible - expertise which is likely to be better known
to private sector firms specializing in the technologies in question.4J

43 In this respect, the multi-stage structure of the public/private partnership bears
striking similarity to the model used by the US federal government for defence
procurement. Because of long lag times between the development and production
of defence weapons, defence production is characterized by severe demand and cost
uncertainties and, as a consequence of required up-front investments in assetspecific research and production, is beset by endemic hold-up problems. One of the
principal models used to resolve these difficulties is a multi-stage selection process
that involves competition for a procurement contract on the basis of research ideas
tendered in the first stage of the selection process. Interestingly, and in contrast to
the structure typically used in the public/private partnership infrastructure studies
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On the approach advocated by proponents of the vertically integrated model of infrastructure provision, it is critical that the government be able to specify some desired outcome or output against which
competing designs can be evaluated. This may be more feasible in some
infrastructure projects than others. For example, in designing a bridge
or a toll road, the government could stipulate that the bridge or road
must be capable of moving a given volume of traffic over given units of
time. In other projects, such as designing airport facilities, the policy
objective is much less easy to specify, involving the aggregation and
reconciliation of many preferences;44 in these cases private sector
providers will face difficulties in determining what criteria their potential designs will be evaluated against, and government and public sector
agents will have diff~cultyevaluating competing and perhaps sharply
different design proposals without well-specified outcome measures, at
least if the risk of appearing arbitrary, subjective, or politically motivated (or even corrupt) is to be a~oided.~'
Obviously, the less clearly

we examined, the federal government will subsidize the development of designs in
the first stage of the selection process. However, the subsidy covers only a portion of
the costs actually incurred by bidders in the qualifying rounds of the project and so,
as in the case of the infrastructure projects we examined, the bidders' decision to
invest in research and development is based on a private cost-benefit analysis that
compares the upfront costs incurred in design development with the probability of
winning the project multiplied by its economic value. After the design proposals are
submitted, the government will select two (or more) bidders (of the five or so
initially qualified to enter the competition) to proceed to the second stage of the
competition where a more detailed prototype of the weapon is developed for
competition in the third and final stage of the selection process, wherein the
winning bidder will then secure from government a cost-reimbursement-based
procurement contract to supply the weapons. An excellent overview of the defence
procurement process is provided by William P. Rogerson 'Economic Incentives and
the Defense Procurement Process' (1994) 8J. of Econ. Perspectives 65.
44 See David Sappington and Joseph Stiglitz 'Privatization, Information and Incentives'
(1987) 6 J. of Policy Analysis & Management 567, 575.
45 Curtis Taylor ('Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments'
(draft dated October 1993) forthcoming in the AER) argues that the golden carrot
tournament solves for both the input monitoring and output specification problems
associated with research: 'Competition among researchers trying to win the contest
causes expending effort to be incentive compatible. Moreover, the only role of the
courts is to ensure that the specified "prize" ... is awarded to one of the contestants at
the conclusion of the contest. It is not men necessary that a court be a b b to veri3 the rank
order o f t k 5 n a l entries since t k sponsor typically has littb incentive other than to exchange the
pnze for the innovation it values most.' Nevertheless, given endemic accountability
problems surrounding public officials, the application of this conclusion to competitions involving adjudication by public officials is somewhat problematic.
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specified the project selection criteria, the greater the latitude that
decision-makers have in selecting projects; hence the greater the
vulnerability of the process to investment by bidding firms in socially
unproductive influence a ~ t i v i t i e s .As
~ ~ noted earlier, concern over
these difficulties was centrally at issue in the Pearson International
Airport redevelopment, where, in part, ambiguity in the definition of
required outputs buttressed concerns over the potential for patronage.
The government could, of course, unbundle the design function
from the other functions in the bundle and hold a separate design
competition just for the ideas. Here again, however, the problems of
stipulating with sufficient precision the outcome criteria against which
competing designs are to be evaluated would arise. Indeed, government
traditionally has often contracted out the design function for various
public facilities, by hiring architectural or engineering firms to design
public buildings or other facilities. In so doing, the government is able
to utilize private sector firms with relevant technical expertise and
significant investments in reputational capital, which reduce information asymmetries in the design process. However, in stimulating a
vigorous competition for design ideas on an unbundled basis where the
objective is to generate a detailed design which would then support a
public tendering process of the traditional kind with respect to the
construction of the facility that is the subject of the winning design, the
government is likely to have to offer a large fee to the winning design
proponent (given the 'winner takes all' nature of the competition), in
order that participants in the design competition will find it rational to
invest significant resources in developing a detailed design, given their
expected return on this investment. In the context of defence procurement, William Rogerson speculates that public concerns over the
magnitude (and scope for manipulation) of the ex post prize necessary
to stimulate optimal ex ante investment in research supports a bundled
tournament where this premium can be embedded in the production
contract, thereby limiting public transparency of the prize.47Often in
the past, government has simply approached several architectural or
other design firms, depending on the nature of the facility, and sought
preliminary ideas, and then committed itself to one designer to develop

46 The problem of influence activities in the context of a multi-stage auction process is
briefly alluded to in Paul Milgrom 'Auctions and Bidding: A Primer' (1989) 3 J of
Ecm. Perspectives 3 , 20. For a discussion of influence activities, see Paul Milgrom and
John Roberts Economics, Organization and Managemat (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall 1992) 1 9 2 4 .
47 Rogerson, supra, 71.
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a detailed design. It is not clear that this process generates an optimal
supply of the best design ideas, particularly in large infrastructure
projects where different features of different design proposals may be
attractive and the optimal design may be a combination of features
from a number of proposals. In this case, losing bidders have to
contemplate the possibility that the government will use some of their
design ideas in the ultimate design, but that they will not be compensated at all for these ideas (the problem of appropriability). Thus,
in order to attract a significant number of detailed design proposals,
only a large expected return reflecting an appropriate risk premium is
likely to attract sufficient losing bidders from which to develop a
combined set of design specifications. However, even in this case,
bidders still face strong incentives to develop proposals that capitalize
on their firm-specific advantages in production, even if the design that
is ultimately produced is not least cost. In this way, bidders limit the
capacity of government to transfer their design innovations to other
bidders.48
An alternative approacb to design production would be to commission the preparation of a number of design proposals, probably on a
fixed-fee basis; but now government may face a larger pay-out than
under the winner-takes-all approach and, more seriously, would create
no incentives (beyond reputation effects) for proponents to invest
resources in developing superior rather than inferior design proposals.
Information asymmetries may subvert the capacity of government to
determine the level of effort expended in design development.
The government faces many of these problems with the vertically
integrated infrastructure provision model. That is to say, competing
consortia are unlikely to have equal strengths across all the various
functions in the bundle, yet the winning bidder must be chosen on the
basis of some balance of strengths and weaknesses. Even if a number of
the competing bidders have roughly equivalent strengths in the design
function, for a large complex facility (such as an airport) it is unlikely
to be the case that one consortium's design is superior in all respects to
the others. Thus, ideally, the government would wish to combine the
best features of the various competing design proposals. However, this

48 In this respect, investment in these firmspecific design features bears analytical
similarity to the entrenchment problem related to excessive investment by managers
in manager-specific investments so as to limit the gains from displacement. See
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 'Management Entrenchment: The Case of
Manager-Specific Investments' (1989) 25 J. ojFin. Econ. 123.
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combination implies significant complications in the bidding and
contracting process.49 In this respect, the vertically integrated model
exhibits obvious tied sales properties. One option is to partly decouple
the design competition from the other functions in the bundle by
requiring all qualified, vertically integrated consortia first to submit
their design proposals, on the assumption that it will still be in their
interests subsequently to bid on the winning design (which may be
another consortium's design proposal or represent a combination of
features of the competing designs). Presumably, the consortium with
the winning or predominant design proposal may feel it has informational, technological, or other advantages over rival bidders in
bidding on the remaining functions, and thus there is an incentive to
prepare the design proposal which commends itself most to the
government. Here again, as with an unbundled competition for design
ideas, the cost of preparing a detailed design proposal for a large
infrastructure project might be very substantial, but unlike an
unbundled design competition there may be no direct compensation
for the winning design. Moreover, by restricting the design function to
consortia capable of bidding on the remaining functions, proposers in
the design competition now face serious free-rider problems in that a
rival consortium with an inferior design but superior construction and
other capabilities may win the integrated bidding competition. These
risks are likely to generate significant risk premiums in vertically
integrated bids, given both the inherent costs of preparing such
comprehensive bids and the appropriability problem with design
innovations. They are also, as mentioned above, likely to result in

49 Some of these problems are revealed by the value engineering exercise that was
incorporated into the Highway 407 selection process. After the first-stage design
tournament, the government sought to pool the best design ideas submitted by each
of the bidders into a baseline project description that could then serve as the basis
for bidders to make more elaborate proposals in subsequent bidding stages. By
increasing the common base of information available to bidders in a common values
auction, uncertainty over the underlying value of goods is diminished, which should,
in turn, enhance bidder competitiveness. Apart from its effect on competition, the
exercise provided the public with an opportunity to express preferences over tradeoffs in the design of the project, for example, between safety and cost. Nevertheless,
value engineering is not unproblematic; recognizing that a bidder's best ideas will
be appropriated for the benefit of all bidders in later-stage bidding over the
production contract, consortium members have strong incentives to hold back their
best ideas to protect their relative advantages. This effect may, however, be dulled by
the fact that if a bidder withholds sound ideas from the first stage of the selection
process, its ability to proceed to subsequent bidding stages may be jeopardized.
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bidders making socially perverse investments that attempt to limit the
ability of other bidders to exploit their design proposals.
An alternative approach to mitigating these problems would be to
deal with them at the contracting rather than at the bidding stage of
the process. That is to say, bids on all functions - design, construction,
financing, operation, and maintenance - could be solicited in a single
competition, but the winner of the competition would thereby win the
right merely to attempt to negotiate a contract thereafter with the
government, in the process of negotiating which the government would
be free to introduce design or other features of losing bidders' proposals. The winning bidder would then have to decide whether to accept
these proposed changes to its proposal. But again, various problems
present themselves. First, suppose the winning bidder does not accept
all or any of the changes to its bid proposed by the government.
Presumably, in the absence of a concluded contract, the government
would be free to withdraw from negotiations and perhaps reapproach
one of the other bidders. Or the government may behave more strategically and play the winning bidder off against other bidders in the
contract negotiations. Alternatively, the winning bidder could accept all
or most of the changes proposed by the government and modify its bid,
but losing bidders will not unreasonably complain that they should have
been given a similar opportunity to modify their bids in the light of
what is really a rolling or evolving set of contract specifications ('a
moving target'). Moreover, once a government agency has precommitted to a particular bidder before negotiating the detailed contract,
competitive pricing discipline is likely to be atten~ated.~'Thus,
extracting from private sector firms in the competitive bidding process
an optimal supply of innovative design ideas without attenuating
competitive pricing discipline presents serious diff~culties.
Beyond eliciting an optimal supply of ideas, the arguments for
bundling the design function with other functions have some force.
Under more traditional modes of developing infrastructure projects
(and indeed building other facilities), it has been a common complaint
that separating the design function (and personnel) from the construc-

50 Once the government has publicly announced its selection of a winning bidder, it is
subject to political embarrassment if it is forced to reopen the bidding process in
the event that it is unable to come to terms with that consortium, especially in a
setting where concerns over project timeliness explain government's decision to opt
for the public/private partnership in the first place. Concern over these political
costs creates undesirable lock-in effects which tip the post-selection balance of
bargaining power in favour of the winning consortium.

tion function (and personnel) in different teams (hiring an architect to
undertake the design of a building while contracting out its construction to another firm, for instance) increases the risk that the designer
will be insensitive to 'constructability' problems presented by his design.
Given that 80% of the costs of many large-scale construction projects
are estimated to be determined by the design, dissonances between the
design and construction teams may prove very costly,51although again
it is not entirely clear why reputational markets for professional firms
would not minimize these problems. In the vertically integrated infrastructure provision model, the design and construction teams form part
of a larger team that is organized by the consortium undertaking the
project, the premise being that the consortium is able to reduce
coordination problems through internalizing these functions at lower
cost than the public sector where it contracts out these functions
separately. However, given that design and construction expertise are
likely to reside in different groups of personnel and probably in
different firms that are partners in the consortium, at most the
coordination problems are minimized but not eliminated through this
form of cooperation - presumably by more regular contact between the
design and construction teams, by developing design and construction
plans simultaneously and interactively rather than sequentially, and
perhaps by repeat dealings between the two teams on different projects.

c) Financing, design, and construction. The construction function on
large public facilities has almost invariably been contracted out to the
private sector, and so the vertically integrated infrastructure provision
model represents no change in this respect. However, it does affect
various interdependencies between the financing, design, and construction functions by changing incentives in important ways. Most of these
relate to how the project is to be financed and operated. If the private
sector provider is itself to finance the construction of the facility and to
recoup this investment and a return thereon out of subsequent user
fees generated from operating the facility, the government has no
direct concerns with the initial capital costs, provided that the design
which the private sector provider has committed itself to, which will
obviously reflect expected revenue constraints, is acceptable to the
government. Alternatively, where the project is not to be financed at all
or in its entirety from user fees, but wholly or in part from government

51 See Issaka Ndekugri and Adrian Turner 'Building Procurement by Design and Build
Approach' (1994) 120 J. of Construction Enginea'ng and Management 243.

subsidies, then the government, by stipulating a maximum size of
subsidy, will create similar constraints on feasible design
- and construetion options. In contrast, the government is vulnerable to opportunistic
behaviour in this context from the private sector provider given the
'essential' nature of many infrastructure facilities and the likely political
inability of a government simply to let such a facility fail, with the
attendant disruption, pending government assuming full control of the
facility or identifying another private sector operator. The private sector
operator may well gamble that, notwithstanding an extravagant or
misconceived design or excessive construction costs, it can coerce the
government into relaxing constraints on user fees so as to permit
monopoly pricing, or to raise the level of maximum committed subsidies. Thus, both the design and construction functions are highly
sensitive to incentives created by the nature of the financing function.
The nature of these cross-function incentive effects (interdependencies) are key to understanding what superficially may appear to be one
of the major mysteries of private sector financing of infrastructure
projects. In most cases, private sector financing will carry a higher cost
of capital than government financing, simply because the default risk
on sovereign debt (given that governments have access to the entire
taxpayer base) is obviously lower than for a private sector infrastructure
provider, where the cost of capital will reflect both project-specific risks
and its de jure or de facto limited liability. Thus, if the financing
function were viewed in isolation from the other functions, given the
lower cost of sovereign debt relative to private sector debt, we should
see governments financing all activities in the economy. The fact that
they finance very few of these activities, at least in a market economy,
requires an explanation. In the present context, the explanation
appears to lie in the fact that while the cost of capital to the private
sector infrastructure provider will be higher than the cost of an equivalent amount of capital to the government (which has the same access to
private capital markets), offsetting efficiency gains from the other
functions performed by the private sector provider are influenced
positively by virtue of the fact that it is bearing the financial risk on the
project. However, this trade-off in turn depends upon how the capital
investment is to be recouped. If the investment must be recouped from
competitively determined revenues from the project, then this will
create socially appropriate incentives with respect to the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of projects. While it may be
true that governments and private sector infrastructure developers
borrow capital from the same sources, lenders' incentives with respect
to private sector project financing are sharply different. With the

government as borrower, lenders can ignore project-specific returns,
given that lenders ultimately have access to the government's entire tax
and asset base. With project financing, project returns become central;
lenders are likely to screen development consortia more carefully
before lending, to insist on adequate security and financial penalties
against non-completion or default, and to monitor performance more
closely through the inclusion of numerous, tailored covenants than they
would if they were lending to government which in turn then financed
the project, thus significantly improving the performance of the
infrastructure pr~vider.~'
However, with respect to most forms of infrastructure, the infrastructure operator is likely to possess some measure of market power and
thus, in the absence of contractual restriction or regulation, may be
able to charge monopolistic user fees. Given that even a monopolist has
some incentive to maximize profits by minimizing costs, it is not
obvious that this will change its calculus with respect to design, construction, operation, and maintenance costs or lenders' monitoring of
these functions. However, if user fees are restricted or regulated by the
government to prevent monopoly pricing, through some form of rateof-return regulation, this may create incentives for the private sector
provider to overcapitalize the project in order to expand the rate base
or to exert weak controls over operating costs, given the cost-plus
nature of this form of regulation.
Another argument that is sometimes made for private sector financing of infrastructure projects, notwithstanding the higher cost of private
sector capital, is that this serves an economic certification or verification
function, and that projects will only proceed that have a positive net
present value to the provider, whereas the public sector in selecting
projects will not necessarily feel so constrained. This argument has only
qualified force. Obviously, a private sector provider, in making his
calculus, will be influenced only by private costs and benefits. Where
monopolistic setting of user charges is possible, a project may have a
positive net value to him even though its social value may be negative,
once the dead-weight social losses are taken into account. In contrast, if
user charges were to be constrained by regulation to marginal cost
(ideally marginal social costs, including congestion and environmental
externalities), given the high ratio of fixed to variable costs entailed in

52 See Ronald Daniels and George Triantis 'The Role of Debt in American Corporate
Governance' (Summer 1995) U. of Calif: LR; William Pearson, President, Agra
Engineering Group, Toronto, interview with the authors 1 September 1994.

many infrastructure projects, revenues are unlikely to cover the costs of
the project and to generate a positive net present value. A more
complicated scheme of regulated prices, such as Ramsey prices, would
permit price discrimination where prices are inversely related to
elasticity of demand so that the marginal consumer is served, but
average total costs are covered by charging inelastic demanders more
than marginal costs. Thus, a private sector provider's judgement on the
financial viability of a project is a useful check or discipline on a
government's decision to proceed with such a project only if these
pricing issues are clearly and appropriately resolved at the outset. Given
that the government, albeit through negotiations with the private sector
provider, will determine and administer these contractual or regulatory
constraints on pricing, this to an important extent endogenizes government policy considerations in the private sector provider's calculus as to
the economic viability of the project, and undermines this judgment as
an independent second check on the social desirability of the project.
Where a project is not to be financed entirely out of user fees, but
partly or entirely from government operating subsidies, a private sector
provider's judgment as to the financial viability of the project again is
not an exogenous check on the government's decision to proceed with
it, given that the government's decision over the nature and scale of
the subsidies is endogenous to the private provider's calculus.
Apart from the necessary relationship between the viability of the
initial capital investment and subsequent options with respect to the
pricing of services or the nature and size of government operating
subsidies, a private sector provider's judgement about the financial
viability of a project will reflect only private expected costs and benefits
and not expected social costs and benefits. With many large infrastructure projects, there are likely to be significant positive and negative
externalities, which will not be reflected in this private calculus, but
which government agencies overseeing the project may wish to consider
in judging the social viability of the project or in containing or compensating for these externalities through other policies. A private sector
firm's willingness to privately finance an infrastructure project may
reflect a disregard for negative externalities. Conversely, an unwillingness to privately finance such a project may simply reflect an inability to
capture or charge for the benefits of positive externalities. In both cases
the private financing decision may not be congruent with a social
welfare calculus.
d) Operation and maintenance. With respect to the operating function,
this could, like prior functions, be unbundled and contracted out

discretely. Indeed, this is sometimes done with infrastructure. Presumably in this case, the government could simply enter into a management contract for a fixed term, probably accompanied by a lease of
existing facilities for the same term, to a private sector provider chosen
through a competitive tendering process in very much the way that
Demsetz has argued is feasible in creating competition for natural
monopoly markets.= Several well-known problems present themselves
with this option.54 First, if the infrastructure facility has monopoly
features to it entailing some degree of market power on the part of the
operator, the government faces a choice between, on the one hand,
maximizing the sale price of the franchise by allowing the operator to
charge monopoly prices to users or, on the other hand, soliciting bids
not on the basis of the highest franchise price but the lowest contractually permitted set of user prices. Presumably the latter is the social
ideal, in that it avoids the dead-weight losses associated with monopoly
pricing, although it imposes a much more substantial burden on the
public sector in reviewing and approving initial bids and monitoring
adherence to price commitments thereafter and may have less attractive
political properties than maximizing the franchise price.
Under either form of competitive bidding, the winning bidder
presumably has similar incentives to minimize costs over the period of
the operating contract in order to maximize net profits. However, a
major divergence between a private and social calculus in this respect
relates to maintenance costs. Where the assets are long-lived, but the
operating contract is of shorter duration, there are obvious incentives
for the operator to skimp on maintenance or improvement costs where
these will have little or no impact on the revenue stream until the postcontract period. This problem could, of course, be solved by making
the initial operating contract the same length as the expected life of
the assets, thus fully internalizing both the costs and benefits of expenditures on maintenance, although not necessarily capital improvements,
replacements, or facility expansion where returns can only be realized
thereon beyond the term of the contract. In many cases involving largescale infrastructure, this internalization function may entail initial
contracts of 50 or 60 years. Another advantage of integrating the
design, construction, financing, and operating functions in these cases

53 Harold Demsetz 'Why Regulate Utilities?' (1968) 1 1 J. ofI,aw &Econ. 55.
54 For a review of these problems, see Keith Crocker and Scott Masters 'Regulation
and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for
Public Utility Regulation' J. of Econ. (forthcoming).

is that the private provider will have an incentive to minimize the lifecycle costs of the project. Where initial capital investments and ongoing
maintenance are substitutes for one another, less initial capital investment results in higher subsequent maintenance and conversely. The
optimal mix of the two functions is more likely to be selected by an
integrated provider. However, technological uncertainties, uncertainties
relating to market demand, and uncertainties relating to the durability
or stability of surrounding government policies that may affect the costs
or revenues generated by the project make these long-term contracts a
much riskier proposition from the perspective of a private sector
operator. In turn, the government will have committed itself for the life
of the assets to a single operator, notwithstanding the possible subsequent emergence of superior operators. While the government may
attempt, in a long-term operating contract, to specify all performance
obligations of the operator, over a long-term contract these are very
difficult to specify completely ex ante and in any event are likely to
entail intensive and costly monitoring. Short-term contracts reduce
some of these problems (the difficulty of anticipating all future contingencies) while exacerbating others (the incentive to degrade the assets,
for example). Moreover, while there is at least the potential for periodic competitive retendering of the contract, as Williamson has pointed
out, asset specificity - in this case, specialized human capital relating to
the operation of a facility - may create considerable advantages for the
incumbent at contract renewal junctures, and militate against the
preservation of a competitive contracting e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~
More generally, the case for vertical integration of operation and
maintenance with design, construction, and financing functions in the
provision of infrastructure is that firms can coordinate these functions
at lower cost than can the government; that the cross-function incentive
effects of bundling functions (interdependencies) yield superior
performance to more discrete forms of contracting out, that is, that
decisions affecting the design and construction functions will be
influenced by operating obligations, all of which will be affected by
financing obligations; and that economies of scale and scope can be
realized through integration. The empirical evidence tends to suggest
that indeed vertically integrated private providers of infrastructure
services can complete initial infrastructure construction much more

55 Oliver Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press 1985)
chapter 13 ('Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly'); see also Crocker and
Masters, supra.

quickly than can be done under the traditional mode of public provision with discrete contracting out of particular functions, in large part
because of reductions in transaction and coordination costs through a
more simultaneous and less sequential construction process and greater
freedom from stringent government budget allocation and procurement regulations.56Yet, the value of this benefit should not be overstated; for instance, in the Highway 407 project, it was alleged that use
of the public/private partnership model enabled the government to
reduce the time necessary to complete the project from a projected 20
years through traditional procurement to 4.5 years. However, the
principal factor behind the shortened construction period appears not
to be any design or production efficiency but the government's decision to use off-budget financing to increase the funding for the project
from the original on-budget allocation.
One important offsetting feature of vertical integration is likely to be
a marked reduction in competition for infrastructure contracts, relative
to more discrete or disaggregated contracting-out policies. Economies
of both scale and scope are likely to be such that in bidding on large
integrated infrastructure projects very few firms or consortia are likely
to be able to assemble all the relevant specialized inputs.57 These
problems are, of course, exacerbated when sponsoring governments
impose domestic content restrictions on prospective bidders. Thus, one
would predict a very small number of bidders on many of these contracts. In contrast, by contracting out the various functions involved in
providing and operating infrastructure in a discrete or disaggregated
form, it seems likely that the competitive bidding process with respect
to each function is likely to attract significantly more bidders and to be
correspondingly more vigorous. Empirical evidence with respect to
government procurement generally suggests that increasing the number
of bidders from three to four can result in savings of up to 18%;from
seven to eight, up to 4%; and from ten to eleven, up to 2%.58The
World Bank's Infrastructure for Development report, in relation to what
have hitherto been treated as natural monopolies (electricity and
telecommunications, for example), argues strongly for unbundling
these activities, vertically in the case of electricity by unbundling
generation from transmission and distribution, and horizontally in the
case of telecommunications by unbundling local from long-distance

56 Ndekugri and Turner, supra note 51, 250.
57 See Sappington and Stiglitz, supra note 44, 571, 572.
58 McAfee and McMillan, supra note 41, 151.
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service and cellular or radio paging services, in order to stimulate
greater c~mpetition.~'
While full vertical integration of the provision
of major infrastructure facilities, which the World Bank appears to
favour in other cases, may offer offsetting economic advantages, it may
well entail highly attenuated competition at the bidding stage of the
process (and even less at recontracting intervals), as well as monopoly
provision of all services provided through the facility thereafter by the
winning bidder or parties to whom it in turn has granted exclusive or
monopoly sub-franchises. Nevertheless, if the production of new design
ideas can impact materially on the final value of a proposed project, if
the nature of those ideas cannot be easily specified in advance, and if
explicit prizes for innovative designs cannot be awarded without
attracting political controversy, then restrictions on the number of
entrants competing in the selection process (by, for instance, insisting
on bundled services) increase the value of the expected premium, and
elicit increased research e f f ~ r t . ~
C.

DISTRIBUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Distributional considerations arising from the privatization of infrastructure services are likely to vary widely, depending upon the nature of the
service in question. Where the services have previously entailed substantial cross-subsidies under public provision, for example to rural or lowincome users, these are likely to disappear under an unconstrained,
fully vertically integrated private provision model,6' and thus will
provoke resistance to the adoption of this model. Indeed, under such a
model adverse distributional effects may be exacerbated if the elasticity
of demand by these groups is low, reflecting the absence of choices,
thus permitting monopoly pricing or price discrimination. The private
sector provider may, of course, be required to maintain these crosssubsidies through ongoing contractual or regulatory constraints.
However, these constraints are likely to make it less attractive for private
sector operators to invest in such projects and, even where investment
is feasible, will entail the government in complex, ongoing contractual
or regulatory oversight. The empirical evidence suggests that at some

59 World Bank, supra note 2, 53, 54.
60 Curtis Taylor, supra note 45: 'Because equilibrium research effort by each firm
increases with the size of the prize and decreases with the number of contestants,
there is a one-tc-one correspondence between choosing the optimal prize and entry
fee and choosing the optimal number of contestants and equilibrium effort level.'
61 See John Vickers and George Yarrow 'Economic Perspectives on Privatization'
(1991) 5 J. of Econ. Perspectives 11 1, 114.

point detailed regulatory oversight of a private utility or other infrastructure facility operator is likely to yield performance characteristics
not sharply different from those of a public enterpri~e.~'Thus,
privatization may offer few advantages where the government is committed to maintaining existing subsidy policies (other than through
direct transfers).
Other constituencies whose interests may be jeopardized by
privatization of infrastructure services are members of public sector
labour unions who have been employed in the operation of existing
infrastructure facilities that are to be privatized. After privatization, they
may face lay-offs, lower remuneration, less job security, and more
flexible or more demanding job assignments.
Other constituencies that may be at risk from privatization are both
commercial and retail customers, who face the risk of monopolistic
pricing of user charges by the private sector service provider if not
otherwise constrained either in the initial contract between the government and the provider or by ongoing regulation. Given the essential nature of many infrastructure services, demand for these services is often
inelastic and is likely to support a significant degree of monopoly
pricing.
Still another constituency that may perceive itself as prejudiced by
the privatization of infrastructure services is environmental and related
groups who may see private sector developers and operators of certain
kind of infrastructure facilities, for example toll roads or airports, as
being more likely than public sector providers to discount environmental and related negative e~ternalities.~"
A more general and amorphous constituency that may be opposed
to the privatization of existing infrastructure facilities accompanied by
the imposition of user charges are present users who perceive themselves as having already paid for the facility through various kinds of
taxes and are unlikely to be impressed by arguments as to the efficiency
of the price mechanism in rationing access to scarce or over-utilized
resources.
All of these constituencies are likely to translate the distributional
and other impacts that they are likely to bear from privatization into
political resistance to the process. With a number of these constituencies (labour or users) the resistance is likely to be !ess in the case of the
privatization of new infrastructure facilities than with existing infrastructure facilities. This is particularly likely to be the case where the govern-

62 Hirshhorn, supra note 42, 13, 21.
63 Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, supra note 42, 205.

ment is able to persuade voters and interest groups that the facilities
are unlikely to be built at all in the absence of privatization. However,
the opportunities for ~rofitableprivate development and operation of
new infrastructure (highways, for example), especially in developed
economies where most essential infrastructure already exists, may be
very limited.64As well, development of new infrastructure facilities is
likely to exacerbate the concerns of environmental and similar groups,
relative to the privatization of existing facilities, given the incremental
negative environmental impacts or at least 'Nimby' effects that additions to infrastructure are likely in many cases to generate.
On the other hand, privatization of infrastructure services offers
some political attractions to government. The most prominent attraction is that it enables governments in a period of budget deficits and an
environment of fiscal restraint in many countries to move major capital
expenditures on new infrastructure off-budget or to capitalize existing
infrastructure by sell-offs to the private sector. However, two important
caveats are warranted in this context. First, as noted above, governments, even severely overcommitted governments, can typically borrow
more cheaply than the private sector, so that from a social perspective,
the case for privatizing infrastructure provision, including the financing
function, necessarily turns on the various efficiency and incentive
effects, described above, that flow from integrating the financing
function with other functions to be performed by the private sector
service provider. The second caveat is that the public sector technically
is as capable as the private sector of imposing user charges for its
services. Thus, if investment in an infrastructure project has a positive
net present value, taking into account the revenues that it will generate,
the net long-term worth of the public sector may not be enhanced, and
could conceivably be reduced, by full privatization of an infrastructure
facility.65 Unfortunately, because of the manner in which public accounts are maintained by governments in many countries (cash rather
than accrual accounting), moving the initial capital investment offbudget or capitalizing existing infrastructure, while not simultaneously
reporting forgone future revenues, encourages a form of fiscal illusion
which may fool some taxpayers and citizens concerned with the size of
the current budget deficit.66

64 Hirshhorn, supra note 42, 1.
65 See Oliver Williamson 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange' (1983) 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519.
66 See Jack Mintz and Ross Preston (eds) CapitalBudgeting in the Public Sector (Kingston,
Ont.: John Deutsch Institute for Study of Economic Policy 1993).

Another political attraction of privatization of infrastructure services
is that it enables 'hands tying' or credible commitments with respect to
a range of policy-related risks that relate to both the financial viability
and in some cases social benefits of a project.67 For example, the
World Bank reports that failure to maintain existing basic infrastructure
in many developing countries has proved a more costly policy shortcoming than failure to invest in new infrastructure, at least in terms of
~
the return on the investments i n v ~ l v e d .This
shortcoming seems
largely explained by the inability of governments to commit resources,
on a long-term basis, to infrastructure maintenance in the face of more
pressing day-to-day political or other demands on public resources. By
privatizing, on a vertically integrated basis, the provision of infrastructure, an ongoing commitment to maintenance of the assets (subject to
the difficulties noted above) can be built into the arrangement. Similarly, pricing and subsidy policies can be rendered more stable and
predictable by embodying them in contractual commitments between
the government and private sector providers, and thus made more
resistant to the whims of the political process.69 On the one hand,
without strong ex ante commitments in these areas, private sector
providers, having incurred large sunk costs in the initial capital investment, are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by government in
changing the rules of the game ex post, which will increase risk premiums demanded ex ante or at the limit discourage more risk-averse
firms from bidding at
On the other hand, in order to protect or
enhance the private sector provider's revenue stream, the government
may be tempted to make anticompetitive commitments which may enhance the government's return on the contract, for example, a commitment not to build other competitive facilities, or to permit monopoly
pricing of user charges, or to relax environmental constraints, where in
each case social welfare may be impaired. But the government, by
distancing itself from service provision and tying its hands, short of
legislating cancellation or modification of the contract and arguably
risking claims for compensation, can deflect some of the political costs
that it might otherwise have to confront if it pursued these policies
itself as a public operator.

67 World Bank, supra note 2, 27, 29.
68 Ibid.
69 See Pablo Spiller 'Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities Privatization'
(1993) 2 Industrial @ Cmporate Change 387.
70 Vickers and Yarrow, supra note 61, 114; Sappington and Stiglitz, supra note 44, 574
and 580.

Another political advantage of privatizing infrastructure provision in
a period of fiscal constraint is that it permits employment creation in
depressed labour markets without committing additional public resources to this objective (albeit again something of a fiscal illusion if
the government is forgoing subsequent revenues from the facility). The
empirical evidence suggests, as noted above, that fully vertically integrated private infrastructure providers can complete major infrastructure projects much more quickly than public provision under the
traditional disaggregated form of contracting out. Thus, under privatization, jobs in the initial construction phase of the facility can be
created more quickly than under public provision. Whether all of these
jobs should be counted as net increments to the labour force may again
be largely a fiscal illusion. Given that private sector infrastructure
providers simply draw on existing sources of domestic and international
capital and d o not in themselves expand the pool of savings and capital
in the economy, it should probably be assumed that most of these projects involve diverting capital from one activity to another where the
expected private return is higher.71 In terms of job creation effects,
the net effect, while more concentrated and visible, may be quite
ambiguous.
A final argument for privatization of infrastructure services is an
infant-industry argument. By governments privatizing the provision of
such services to domestic private providers or consortia, the develop
ment of the necessary qualities of specialized expertise and the resolution or minimization of coordination problems in large multidiscip
linary teams can be advanced by a process of learning-bydoing. Given
the size of the global market for infrastructure projects described by the
World Bank in its recent report, providing infrastructure services may
develop into a major export market. However, implicit in this argument
is that governments in awarding infrastructure contracts should adopt
an explicit preference in favour of domestic firms, even where foreign
firms could provide a superior or cheaper service, thus 'taxing' domestic users or taxpayers, directly or indirectly, in the short run. As with
infant-industry arguments that have been invoked over the past century
to justify trade protectionism in various contexts,72such policies may
promote and preserve firms or industries that have a long-term comparative disadvantage and the 'tax' on users or taxpayers equally

71 Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, supra note 42, 101.
72 See Robert Howse and Michael Trebilcock The Regulation of Intaational Trade
(London: Routledge 1995) chapter 1.
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becomes permanent. In addition, the increasingly stringent government
procurement and foreign investment provisions that have been adopted
in NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreement of the GATT may in some
cases elicit justifiable complaints by foreign governments or firms of
di~crimination.~'
D. T H E STATUS OF GOVERNMENT AS A PARTY T O T H E PARTNERSHIP

CONTRACT

So far, we have emphasized the problems inhering in public/private
partnerships owing to the nature of infrastructure assets, and the
distinct design problems related thereto. However, as alluded to earlier,
a fundamental problem for these partnerships relates to the status of
government as a party to the contracts. Because of its inherent legislative powers, government involvement presents distinct and quite vexing
contracting problems.74 First, particularly in countries such as Canada
that lack constitutionally entrenched property rights, governments are
able to abrogate express contractual commitments through legislative
fiat. In other words, even where the contracting parties have been able
to anticipate and to contract ex ante for the risks of future acts of
contractual opportunism by government, the ability of governments to
nullify these contracts through express legislative amendment attenuates the degree to which private parties can rely on governmental
contractual ~ndertakin~s.~%onse~uentl~,
the value of even an express
contractual commitment to provide fair compensation in the event of a

73 Ibid. chapters 6 and 11.
74 The lack of institutional safeguards against government takings is interpreted by
Douglass North as a critical constraint on the pace of national economic develop
ment. See Douglass C. North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Growth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990); and Douglass C. North and Barry R.
Weingast 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing
Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England' (1989) 49 J of Econ. Hist. 803. See
also Spiller, supra note 69, 387; Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller 'Regulation, Institutions, and Commitment in Telecommunications' in Proceedings of the World Bank
Conference on Deuelujnnent Economics (Washington, DC: The World Bank 1994); and
Pablo Spiller and Ingo Vogelsang 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory
Commitment in the UK' draft paper dated 16June 1994, on file with the authors.
75 This is the paradox of sovereignty. The 'greater the sovereign's ability to impel
submission by citizens, the less the ability of a third-party arbiter to compel performance by the sovereign, and so the less the sovereign's ability to induce voluntary
cooperation. This paradox turns the sovereign's power into the sovereign's handicap.' David
~
bythe-sovereign: Lessons from the American
D. Haddock ' ~ o r k s e e i nConfiscation
West' in Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill (eds) The Political Economy o j the
American West (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 1994) (emphasis added).

'taking' is subject to doubt. Second, even where governments face
constitutional or other institutional constraints on their power to
confiscate outright the undertaking of a private owner/operator,
considerable contractual design problems emanating from the breadth
of governmental policy powers remain. Here, it is difficult ex ante for
parties to anticipate the myriad ways in which governments can infringe
the franchise value of the private investor. Simple cases, such as when
government transfers title or establishes a competitor to the investor,
can be anticipated in advance, and can be restrained by the judiciary.
However, beyond these simple cases, the task of design is rendered
much more difficult. For instance, in the case of an asset like an airport
terminal, changes in transportation, environmental, occupational health
and safety, or regional development policy could all adversely impact
the franchise value of the undertaking. Not only is the range of possible
'takings' difficult to anticipate in advance, but it is also difficult to
differentiate legitimate governmental actions from those actions which
are nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to debase the value of
the investors' interests, leaving investors with little choice but to tender
their interests in the project to government on exploitative terms.
The problem in differentiating permissible from impermissible
governmental modifications of state contractual commitments is
graphically illustrated by the experience of the United States Supreme
Court in interpreting the Constitution's contract clause, which prohibits
states from enacting laws impairing the obligation of c~ntracts.~"he
clause was first interpreted by the Court in cases involving public
grants, such as Fletcher v. Peck,77 and Dartmouth College v. Woodw~rd,~~
wherein the Court prevented state governments from abrogating contractual obligations that were explicitly made to private beneficiaries.
However, by 1837, the Court began to retreat from an expansive
interpretation of the contract clause, by, for instance, declining to
incorporate into a toll-bridge charter an implied promise by a state not
to authorize construction of a competing bridge, even though this
would severely affect the value of the franchise that had been

76 Article 1, subsection 10 of the Constitution. Although there is no explicit constitutional provision that imposes a similar constraint on the federal government, it is
arguable that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause may have (or had) this
effect: see Laurence Tribe A d c a n Constitutional Law 2d ed. (Mineola, NY The
Foundation Press 1988) 613nl. See also Bowen v. Public Agencies 477 US 41 (1986).
77 6 Cranch (10 US) 87 (1810).
78 4 Wheat. (17 US) 518 (1819).

awarded." By the late 1930s, the clause fell into virtual disuse, a
situation which was not reversed until the Court's decision in 1977 in
United States Trust Co. of New Yorlz v. New Jersy.'O In that case, the Court
prohibited New Jersey and New York from repealing a statutory covenant that earmarked certain revenues and reserves from rail transportation as security for state borrowings. The states sought to use the funds
to subsidize rail passenger transportation. The Court held that the
contract impairment was not reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose, in this case, state transportation, energy, and
environmental goals." Nevertheless, under the US Trust Co. doctrine,
it is clear that cases involving more subtle debasement of the state
contractual or quasicontractual commitments could still withstand
constitutional scrutiny where the end to be achieved could not be
achieved through alternative means."
In any event, as demonstrated by the federal government's decision
to abrogate its contractual commitments to the Pearson Development
Corporation in respect of the TIT2 development, it is clear that the
scope for governmental modification (or abrogation) of state franchise
contracts is more than speculative. This problem of government
opportunism is, however, by no means novel in Canada. In an exhaustive analysis of the performance of long-term franchise contracts
governing natural monopolies in a range of different industries (electricity, railways, telephony, tramways, water, and gas) from the mid1800s to the 1930s in Canada, John Baldwin argues that infirmities in
the institutional environment enabled governments to exploit o p
portunistically the sunk investment costs of franchise operators, ultimately leading to a general contractual failure that resulted in a form
of vertical integration that linked consumers and suppliers, namely
high levels of state ownership of such assets.'"aldwin
cites several

79 Charks River B d g e v . Warren Bridge 36 US (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
80 431 US 1 (1977).
81 In subsequent cases, the Court has emphasized that state abrogation of its own
contractual commitments will attract considerably less curial deference than state
legislative interference with private contracts generally. See, for instance, Keystone
Bitminous Coal Assn. v. deBenedictis 480 US 470 (1987).
82 For an analysis of the revival of the contract clause see Bernard Schwartz 'Old Wine
in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the Contract Clause' in Philip B. Kurland and
Gerhard Casper (eds) The Supreme Court Reuiew (1979) 95-122; and Richard A.
Epstein 'Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause' (1984) 51 U. Chi. I 3 703.
83 John Baldwin Regulatory Failure and Raewal: The Evolution of the Natural Monopoly
Contract (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada 1989); see also Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles Monopoly's Momat: The Organization and Regulation of
Canadian Utilities 1830-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1986).

examples of contractual failure leading to nationalization: the decision
by the federal Board of Railway Commissioners to limit the freight rates
charged by private railways during a period of rapid price inflation,
resulting in the demise and nationalization of two major railways;R4the
Manitoba legislature's threatened imposition of a discriminatory tax on
Bell Canada's operations in the province as a prelude to nationalization
by the province;s5 and the Ontario legislature's use of legislative
amendments designed to abrogate contractual and legislative commitments made to investors in power generation and distribution, electric
tramway, and electric lighting franchises; all in an effort to bolster the
prospects of a newly created provincial electric utility - Ontario
Hydro." Baldwin's claim is that the source of the failure of private
franchise contracts in Canada resides in weak judicial traditions (specifically, a failure to regard governmental action other than an outright
taking of title as a taking) and the absence of constitutional protection
for property rights.87 Had the institutional regime been structured
differently, Baldwin speculates that private ownership subject to regulatory oversight would have been a viable substitute for nationalization a course of evolution more typically followed in the United States.88
Interestingly, many of the franchise contracts concluded during the
period of Baldwin's study had properties strikingly similar to the
publidprivate partnerships observed today. The contracts were long
term, involved durable assets in areas where technology and demand
conditions were changing or, at least, somewhat uncertain, and often
contemplated government equity interests in the project through a
fixed or varying level of participation in gross revenues. Further, the
contracts, at least in the initial stages of their evolution, specified the
obligations of the parties in vague, aspirational terms, a feature which
ultimately forced the parties to develop more elaborate contractual
mechanisms (through more detailed specification of terms and the
creation of arbitral governance mechanisms) that would deal with

84 Grand Trunk and Canadian Northern. See discussion in Baldwin, supra, chapter 4.
85 Baldwin, supra note 83, 73-4.
86 To be fair, the government's actions followed a series of failed attempts to compel
the electric rail and lighting franchisees to abide by the terms of their earlier
contract. See discussion in Baldwin, supra note 83, chapter 10.
87 Many of these same themes are developed by George Priest 'The Origins of Utility
Regulation and the Theories of Regulation Debate' (1993) 36 J. @Law U Econ. 289.
88 See also George Priest, supra. In contrast, Spiller argues that some countries were
able to achieve significant levels of governmental commitment in respect of upfront
private sector investments by relying on judicial enforcement of governmental
licences. However, this mechanism imposed costs in terms of forgone adjustment to
changing circumstances (Spiller, supra note 69).
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adjustment to changing contracting conditions, both on renewal and
before.8gThe question then arises as to whether the current institutional environment renders the contractual adjustment problems
studied by Baldwin moot. While the role of the judiciary in constraining
governmental opportunism through contractual interpretation is
subject to debate, there is still no constitutionally entrenched contract
or property rights clause in Canada, attenuating the constraints that
could be imposed on government. Moreover, while certain international obligations (chapter 10 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, for example) constrain governmental actions in respect of
procurement decisions, the constraints on ex post governmental action
are much weaker.g0
Given the dearth of formalized institutional constraints on governmental opportunism, what constraints will currently operate to ensure
governmental fidelity to contractual undertakings set out in the public/
private partnerships? One possibility is that governments will provide
hostages to support the initiative^.^' For instance, to the extent that
private sector operators have developed considerable expertise in the
operation and maintenance of the projects as a result of learning, then
the decision to expropriate the franchise may imperil these human
capital investments. Alternatively, depending on the operation of
reputational markets, a decision by the government to expropriate the
undertaking may damage its reputational investment, and raise the
costs to it of contracting with subsequent parties." Of course, to be
effective, third parties must be able to observe the government's
conduct and discern that it is opportunistic in character. To the extent
that public/private partnerships are not one-off affairs, but rather are a
frequent and predictable component of government policy-making,
then the costs to government opportunism, in terms of forgone future
benefits, should be correspondingly increased. In this respect, it is
arguable that the current costs to government of impairing its obliga-

89 The same point is made by Priest, supra note 87, who argues that the theories used
to explain the role of regulation in natural monopolies (public interest or industry
capture) ignore the functional similarity between regulation by public commission
and several contractual innovations found in long-term franchise contracts.
90 See Evan Atwood and Michael Trebilcock 'Public Accountability in an Age of
Contracting Out' Can. Bus. LJ (forthcoming).
91 Oliver Williamson 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange'
(1983) 73 Am. Econ. Reu. 519.
92 For a general discussion of the operation of reputational markets, see David Charny
'Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relations' (1990) 104 Ham. LR 373.

tions to holders of debt of public/private partnership are much greater
than to the equityholders. In the former case, whether expressly
guaranteed or not, impairment of a debt obligation associated with a
public/private partnership could have dramatic and severe effects on
government's capacity to finance its broader borrowing^.^^
Yet reputational mechanisms alone may not be a sufficient constraint
on governmental o p p o r t ~ n i s m One
. ~ ~ possible response is to develop
institutions that are capable of augmenting the restraints imposed by
reputational markets. That is, at the time of contract formation,
government could commission an arm's-length review of the contract to
certify the integrity of the selection process, the contract's congruence
with the proposal submitted by the winning bidder (recall the lock-in
problems relating to the lag period between the decision to award the
contract and the actual execution of the contract), and the compatibility of the project with applicable public goals and concerns. Alternatively, and less ambitiously, the evaluation panel that oversaw the selection
process could be required to write and release publicly a summary of
their evaluations of the competing bids and their reasons for preferring
the winning bidder over the remaining bidders. Assuming that a project
has been vetted and vindicated through such a review process, the costs
to government abrogation of the contract on grounds of alleged
process or substantive frailties should be magnified considerably.
Another option is to limit independent review to ex post evaluation that is, only those cases where government decides to renege on its
contractual undertakings. While such review might economize on the
costs of certification, these savings would come at the cost of
heightened private sector uncertainty respecting the status of the
contracts. In any event, if government does opt for a regime predicated
on ex post review, the process would have to be considerably more
rigorous and objective than the highly politicized process invoked by
the federal government to analyse the TIT2 airport deal.

93 Interestingly, the interests between equity and debt holders in respect of a confiscation of an infrastructure undertaking may diverge quite radically, to the extent that
government appropriates the equity investment only. In this case, the default risk to
debt holders will be reduced by having government more closely associated with the
undertaking, thereby enhancing the underlying value of debt. Conversation with
Duncan MacCallum, Gordon Capital, October 1994.
94 Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign
Debt' (1989) 97 J. of Pol. Econ. 155 (more complex institutional arrangements
necessary to support state opportunism than reputation alone).

In considering the desirability of these measures, it is important to
stress that ex post constraints on government conduct, such as mandatory compensation based on expectation damages, may prove eEcacious only in respect of relatively stark types of governmental opportunism. For more subtle types of impairment, that is, takings through
generalized policy initiatives, the case for conferring explicit protection
on parties making infrastructural investments seems no different in
kind from the case that obtains for actors having made investments in
other industries, the value of which are subject to change as the result
of government policy changes. In these cases, Kaplow has argued
persuasively that government compensation for losses occasioned by
regulatory change is undesirable as it would distort incentives for
market-based risk management.95But so long as government continues
to own infrastructure assets that are similar in character to those subject
to public/private partnerships, then the incentive for opportunistic
expropriation through generalized (non-targeted) initiatives is
reduced.96 This is because government will suffer losses on its infrastructure investments similar in character to losses sustained by private
infrastructure investors.
Nevertheless, for relatively stark takings, the case for some type of
protection through expectation damages or injunction is more robust.
To the extent that legal and non-legal sanctions are inadequate,
investors will rely on the pricing mechanism to protect their interests that is, by impounding the expected cost of confiscatory action by
government into the price that the investor is willing to pay for the
franchise. Under this scenario, the costs of future expected opportunism are reflected back onto government in the form of a lowered rate
of return to government from the proposed infrastructure project or a
higher expected risk premium. Alternatively, private investors may need

95 Lewis Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions' (1986) 99 H a w . LR 509.
Contrary views of the scope of government obligation in respect of generalized
takings are developed in M. Graetz 'Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision' (1977) 126 U. Pa. LR 47; and J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru
Nakazato 'Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz
and Kaplow' (1989) 75 Va. LR 1155.
96 This, of course, assumes that governmental actors respond to financial incentives in
the same way that private actors do. See discussion in David Cohen 'Regulating
Regulators: The Legal Environment of the State' (1990) 40 UTLJ 213; and 'Suing
the State' (1990) 40 UTLJ 630 (government officials have only weak incentives to
minimize costs, as excess costs can be transferred to taxpayers or to different
institutions of government). However, for a contrary view, see H. Kee 'Incentives
and Rewards in the Public Sector' (1986) 29 Can. Pub. Admin. 545.

to be induced into making up-front investments by government subsidies (perhaps in the form of transfers of assets having an ongoing
stream of earnings) and/or financing guarantees to generate needed
equity funds. Both of these responses result in more highly leveraged
capital structures that induce excessive risk taking by project managers.'' A final pricing-related strategy is for project managers to
compress the payback period for investment, which may have distortionary effects on risk taking and/or on capital structure. In any event, it is
important to stress that from the perspective of a government that is
intent on keeping its promises, the inability to credibly commit its
intent is costly, and heightens the importance of devising workable and
durable institutional mechanisms that are responsive to this problem.g8
IV

Conclusion

A central theme of this study has been the considerable complexity
entailed in the use of public/private partnerships designed to realize
productive efficiency gains in the development and operation of
physical infrastructure projects. In all of the case studies we explored,
the details of the institutional and contractual framework proved
central in determining whether the infrastructure projects were likely to
generate welfare gains over alternative modes of organization. Since,
save for one of the projects we examined, all of the case studies developed in the study are in the design or construction stages, the task of
evaluating the long-term efficiency consequences of these arrangements
is somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, examination of the incentive
effects of both the selection processes and the contracts involved in
these projects provides a foundation upon which reasonably robust
conclusions can be drawn about the likely performance of these
projects, and the broader implications for policy-makers seeking to
enhance the efficient delivery and operation of physical infrastructure,
both in developed and developing countries.
Commencing with the project selection stage, a first important lesson
concerns the premium that policy-makers should place on responsible
project selection through explicit and searching cost-benefit analysis.
Whatever the merits of arguments which purport to link infrastructure

97 Importantly, because of explicit or implicit government guarantees, creditors may be
indifferent to socially excessive levels of risk taking, and will not devise restrictive
covenants on project managers.
98 See Spiller, supra note 69.

with productivity more broadly, it is clear that in a setting of scarce
resources, policy-makers will be required to make choices among
competing infrastructure projects. While some have advocated the use
of public/private partnerships as a means of certifying or confirming
the alleged welfare properties of proposed projects, the design of the
arrangements governing the projects analysed in the case studies
demonstrates the limited value of such an enterprise. Each of the
projects studied reveal important - albeit sharply varying - levels of
embedded public financial assistance. As argued earlier, once the state
insinuates itself into these projects by, for instance, providing assurances of annual subsidies or of subsidies conditioned on the project's
underlying financial performance, the market's capacity to undertake
an independent valuation of the project is compromised. The problem
with relying on private markets to make these quintessentially public
choices was graphically illustrated in the study of the PEI Fixed Link,
where policy-makers misleadingly touted the private sector's interest in
the highly subsidized project as objective and tangible evidence of its
societal value. Yet in the light of the various rationales for intervention
enumerated in the first part of this study, the market's capacity to make
legitimate judgments respecting the underlying social value of these
projects, even when unclouded by state financial assistance, is of
dubious value.
Assuming that threshold problems of general project selection can
be surmounted (that is, that the most valuable projects are selected for
development in descending order of their social value), and further
that a public/private partnership model constitutes the best means of
organizing the project, then the next challenge is to devise a process
that can identify the most deserving project and/or developer/operator, while ensuring fidelity to political legitimacy concerns. In considering this issue, it is important to emphasize the role that auctions play in
economizing on endemic information problems when valuing highly
idiosyncratic assets. In all of the infrastructure projects that were
examined, there were no obvious benchmarks that policy-makers could
invoke to determine what the minimum return necessary was to entice
private developers to deliver and operate these projects; hence, the
attraction of the competitive auction.
Nevertheless, the traditional information revelation function of
auctions is best served when the good subject to allocation is stable and
well defined. But, the highly bundled character of most public/private
partnerships poses formidable problems for the design of a competitive
bidding process. On the one hand, through reliance on vague and
nebulous project definitions and standards, bidders will have the

latitude necessary to propose novel solutions in response to the government's request. Under a more rigid bid structure, the prospect that
these ideas would be created and then developed into a concrete
proposal would be rendered much more remote. Quite simply, if the
narrow and quite detailed standards enumerated in traditional government procurement competitions were to be used to develop large-scale
infrastructure, the room for private sector innovation and creativity
would be very considerably circumscribed. On the other hand, the less
crystallized the project, the more expensive it will be for bidders to
participate in the process. This expense derives from the out-of-pocket
costs that bidders must incur in incorporating a creative design component into the proposal process and the risk that decision-makers will
evaluate proposed projects on factors unrelated to the underlying
merits of the proposal. As these ex ante bidding expenses increase in
magnitude, so too does the need for ex ante compensation necessary to
entice bidders to participate in the process in the first place. In other
words, ideas matter, but the government will have to pay for them one
way or another, and the question really is how that price is best paid.
So far, the merits of the multidimensional auction process for public
infrastructure projects has been viewed from a strictly efficiency perspective. But given the high levels of public funding typically involved
in these projects, it is important to be cognizant of the important
political legitimacy values that are implicated. One need only recall the
rather intense outpouring of public sentiment surrounding the redevelopment of the Pearson terminals to realize the centrality of these values
in this area. Here, it is apparent that even if there are tangible efficiency gains that can be realized through a multidimensional bidding
process, the public's inability to monitor systematically the selection
process involved in the allocation of projects costing upwards of a half
a billion dollars becomes salient.
Assuming that infrastructure projects can be allocated to the most
deserving bidder through the auction process, the next, and most
daunting, problem relates to the contractual design mechanisms used
to alleviate the opportunism problems inhering in these projects. One
of the major problems that must be confronted in these partnerships
relates to asset degradation, which reflects the fact that these physical
infrastructure projects typically have expected lives which extend well
beyond the term of the lease, and which thus create troubling incentives for chiselling on asset maintenance. The costs of devising and
enforcing contractual solutions to temper these problems must be
balanced against the efficiency gains sought to be realized through the
public/private partnership.

In determining whether the public/private model is a suitable means
for organizing production of a specific physical infrastructure project, it
is useful to highlight what these precise efficiency gains are. As discussed earlier, the principal benefit of the public/private partnership
over traditional procurement models in the delivery of physical infrastructure resides in the bundling or integration of the finance, design,
construction, and operating functions. Integration promotes the formation of cross-functional expertise and also ensures more disciplined
performance of these functions than would be observed were government required to separately contract for the performance of each
function on its own. Nevertheless, the case studies developed in this
article raise doubts surrounding the likelihood of these benefits being
realized on the scale contemplated by their proponents.
The most significant problem stems from de facto unbundling of the
bundled partnership. Again, a striking, indeed recurrent, feature of the
public/private partnership is the high degree of government financial
assistance. The simplest explanation for the assistance relates to the
need to subsidize public goods or to compensate for positive externalities. Yet, if these goals were the exclusive motivation for government
assistance, we would expect to see simple one-time subsidies being
funnelled to project developers instead of the more complex financial
risk-sharing contracts that are documented in this study. Why, given the
loss of integration benefits entailed by such financing, do governments
decide to intervene in the provision of infrastructure in this way?
Perhaps the most important factor explaining the persistence of
public financing relates to the risks of governmental contractual
opportunism faced by private developers in the development and
operation of physical infrastructure projects. In a first-best world, the
risks embedded in the development contract might be divided between
the government and the contractor in a manner that makes the private
developer responsible for the endogenous production risks and the
government responsible for risks of infringement through policy
changes. Each party is the least-cost avoider of the risks that it has been
assigned. Exogenous risks, that is, risks that neither party can control,
should be transferred to the least-cost insurer, in this case, the government, owing to its superior risk-bearing capacity.'' Unfortunately,

99 The claim that government constitutes the lowestiost insurer, hence the best risk
bearer, of exogenous risks is criticized by George Priest in the context. of losses
caused by catastrophic events: see 'The Government, the Market, and the Problem
of Catastrophic Loss' (paper presented at the Conference on Social Treatment of

however, the first-best contractual allocation of risks is not realizable in
this setting, given problems of contractual design. Put simply, a fully
contingent contract outlining the limitations on governmental conduct
cannot be specified owing to endemic foreseeability problems. But,
even if such a contract could be devised, it is, of course, apparent that
in the light of political and constitutional realities, government contractual commitments in respect of risks over which it has direct control
would be virtually impossible to specifically enforce. Its inherent
legislative and regulatory jurisdiction makes the contract susceptible to
unilateral ex post opportunism by a government which has changed, or
which has changed its mind. The problems of unanticipated government action are, of course, pervasive in the modern regulatory state,
but what makes these problems particularly acute in the case of physical
infrastructure are the higher level of risks that reflect the sunk costs,
anticipatory, and asset lumpiness properties of such investments.
It is the combination of government inability to credibly commit to
nonconfiscatory measures, combined with high probabilities (and
accompanying costs) of such intervention, that makes the first-best
contractual solution unattainable, and which remits parties to the
second-best world. It is here that the sundry financial arrangements
observed in the various public/private partnerships become more
readily understandable. In the absence of nuanced contractual riskallocation mechanisms, government risk-bearing through the supply of
financial capital will attenuate the apprehensions of private developers
over future governmental action. So doing will ensure that projects that
might otherwise be negative net present value decisions will be undertaken by the developer. At the limit, government will supply all of the
risk capital and the private developer will work on a cost-plus basis. But
while this contract saves the developer harmless from the costs of future
government action, it does so at too high a price; in terms of the
optimal balance between incentives and insurance, the arrangements
provide excessive insurance, increasing the likelihood of developer
moral hazard, which impairs the productive efficiency gains that
motivated the use of the bundled organizational form in the first place;
hence, the value of more complex intermediate financial arrangements
that do not dampen developer incentives for cost containment but do

Catastrophic Risk, Stanford University, Lucas Conference Center, draft dated 21
October 1994). Among other claims, Priest argues against government superiority in
risk bearing on grounds of government's inability both to evaluate and to sort risks
to ensure a pooling of independent (not variant) risks.

provide some element of insurance. All of the projects surveyed in this
study contain hybrid levels of financial risk sharing, whether achieved
through well-specified subsidies or performance-based rental payments.
In this respect, it should be noted that the financial structure
dictated by optimal risk bearing may also coincide with some of the
imperatives of the tournament-based selection process. The auction
theory literature, for instance, distinguishes between private and
common values auctions. Whereas in the former, the underlying values
relied upon by bidders to frame a bid are solely a function of the
bidder's own costs, in the latter case a bidder can improve his underlying valuation of the good subject to auction by learning his competitors' valuations. Given the role of exogenous factors - such as the level
and direction of network externalities, trends in customer demand, and
government policy changes - the multi-stage tournament for the
franchise is most accurately characterized as possessing both common
and private values properties. McAfee and McMillan argue that where
common value elements are present in an auction, conditioning
payment for the good on a royalty payment will generate more competitive bidding because the significance of inherent differences in bidder
valuations is reduced.Im
It is well known that contractual equilibria are conditioned on a
number of external factors, one of the most important being the
institutional framework for contractual enforcement. In Canada, the
unfortunate events surrounding the abrogation of the Terminals 1 and
2 project, a related decision, amidst the public uproar over the Terminals 1 and 2 contract, to abandon a proposed private runway development project at Pearson International Airport after bids were received but not opened, and the ex post modifications to the terms of
the Highway 407 bidding process, have all contributed to legitimate
concerns over government motivations, creating an environment which
is becoming less congenial to these projects. To remedy this situation,
supplemental institutions will have to be created which will support
durable government commitments.
In a thoughtful article on the relationship between institutions and
government commitment making and keeping, Levy and Spiller have
expressed caution with the degree to which institutional arrangements
designed to support public commitment can be successfully transferred

100 R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan 'Auctions and Bidding' (1987) 25 J. of Econ.

Lit. 699, 717-9.

across co~ntries.'~'
The claim is that if underlying
- social, political,
and constitutional factors - so-called institutional endowments - are not
supportive of restrictions on governmental action, then the imposition
of complex institutional arrangements designed to fetter arbitrary
governmental action will be ineffectual. In this setting, other options,
involving, inter alia, innovative transactional engineering, widespread
public investments and monitoring by supra-national institutions are
required. In the case of public/private infrastructure partnerships, the
often sui generis nature of the projects, the difficulty of specifying clear
outputs, the capacity of governments to confer broad gains on
ratepayers by imposing price restrictions on investor operators, the
need for project flexibility, all combine to subvert the capacity and costeffectiveness of domestic regulatory or judicial remedies aimed at
constraining governmental o p p o r t ~ n i s m . ' I~n this setting, greater
reliance may need to be placed on supranational institutions, such as
the GATT, regional trading blocks, or the World Bank. One possibility is
for the bid protest and expropriation provisions currently set out in the
North American Free Trade Agreement to be enlarged to include
domestic as well as foreign firms. Alternatively, international public and
private lending agencies could agree to condition the provision of
investment on governmental adherence to independent arbitral
decisions made in respect of alleged governmental takings.
In any event, if the public/private partnership is to realize the
expectations of its proponents, a more systematic and objective means
of reconciling government's need for policy flexibility with the market's
need for certainty must be devised. The ad hoc and politically motivated inquiry, such as that undertaken by Robert Nixon to evaluate the
merits of the Pearson redevelopment project, will simply not suffice to
allay market fears over capricious government action in respect of these
investments. Nor, on the other hand, are conventional forms ofjudicial
review of government actions likely to possess the institutional expertise
to evaluate credibly the integrity of the decision-making process
entailed in such large and complex projects.103In the absence of such
,

101 Levy and Spiller, supra note 74.
102 And while ex ante certification procedures may assist in resolving these problems
around the time of project construction, as soon as the project commences
operation, several explicit or implicit modifications will be made to the formal
contract which, in turn, will subvert the value of the earlier certification exercise
and render the owner/operator susceptible to a charge that these changes are in
bad faith and abusive.
103 See Atwood and Trebilcock, supra note 90.
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institutional innovations, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the
current wave of enthusiasm for private sector development of public
infrastructure in both developed and developing economies may turn
out to be little more than a form of political 'cycling' that will replay
the demise of the municipal franchise contract in Canada and the
United States early in this century. Let us hope that we will not be condemned to repeating the errors of history by neglecting that history.
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